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SUMMARY
Fingerprinting techniques operating over the network are proposed to identify various
aspects of industrial control systems (ICSs) including software, hardware, and physical de-
vices. First, a detailed traffic characterization is performed on several power substation
networks to guide the development of the techniques. Round trip times for the resource-
starved embedded devices were observed to be heavily clustered based on device type no
matter how large the physical distance between them, suggesting they were largely based
on processing time. This insight led to the development of cross-layer response time fin-
gerprinting to passively identify device types based on the processing time between TCP
level acknowledgments and application layer responses, with classification accuracy reach-
ing 99% on real-world substation traffic. Complementing these techniques by addressing
a different aspect of ICS networks, methods are developed to fingerprint the physical de-
vices of the ICS. Previous work on physical fingerprinting is extended to improve relay
classification from 92% to 100% and extend the scope of the methods to valves, motors,
and pumps. Building on the idea behind the cross-layer response time methods, techniques
are explored that expand the scope to general programmable logic controllers by generat-
ing program fingerprints from the execution times of control programs. The security of
this technique is enhanced by the addition of proof-of-work functions to provide an upper
bound guarantee that no additional instructions are being executed in the program. Perfor-
mance of all the fingerprinting techniques are discussed with respect to their potential to




In recent years, the confluence of increasingly complex control systems and advancing in-
formation technology (IT) has resulted in a new class of networks, cyber-physical systems.
These networks in the form of industrial control systems (ICS) and supervisory control and
data acquisition (SCADA) systems, are used for a variety of applications ranging from deli-
cate manufacturing processes to critical infrastructures, such as power or water distribution
where safe and reliable operation is paramount. The protocols running on these networks
were often originally developed for dedicated serial communication lines and later adapted
for TCP/IP networks. Although these systems now communicate over networking proto-
cols familiar to the IT world, the true effect of the merging of these two technologies has yet
to be thoroughly studied, and as a result, most research in the area of cyber-physical sys-
tems is based on artificial testbeds and theoretical assumptions that are not always accurate.
One of the areas with the most profound lack of understanding as these systems migrated to
TCP/IP communication was the security implications. With ICS networks in their previous
form relying completely on local, dedicated serial links, the only security concerns were
physical access to the building or devices. As the boundary between the control systems
and the corporate network began to erode for efficiency reasons, the understanding of the
new security concerns lagged behind and has only recently become a popular subject.
Unfortunately, there are several obstacles preventing solid security from being imple-
mented in ICS networks. First, there is little public knowledge on how these networks
behave in the real world. Given the nature of what these systems are actually controlling,
detailed knowledge of how they truly behave is necessary for both improving operation
performance and developing defenses against a new class of cyber attack that could result
in physical harm to both equipment and personnel. Intrusion detection algorithms that per-
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form well in lab experiments and are based on assumptions about the target network do not
always translate well to real-world ICS networks where the nodes are comprised of a het-
erogeneous mix of devices of varying ages and the network architecture and configuration
are not as clean and straightforward. Without published data on the size and intensity of
bandwidth on these networks, security researchers designing these new intrusion detection
systems cannot know what kinds of throughput their algorithms must handle.
Secondly, attacks on ICS networks differ from traditional attacks on IT both in their
methods and goals. Rather than attempting to steal valuable data, an attacker intruding on
an ICS network can theoretically inject false data or commands and drive the system into an
unsafe state. Example consequences of such an intrusion can range from widespread black-
outs in the power grid [1] to environmental disasters caused by tampering with systems
carrying water, sewage [2], oil, or natural gas. These false data and command injections
could be thwarted using strong cryptographic protocols that provide integrity and authen-
tication guarantees, but in ICS networks it is often infeasible to upgrade legacy equipment
to provide them due to lack of processing power, devices being in remote locations, and
the critical nature of the systems that must be online at all times. In fact, some vendors do
not even support the functionality of upgrading devices to install critical patches. When
our previous research found vulnerabilities in several power system devices and they were
reported to ICS-CERT, the resulting official advisory for one of the products stated that
“There is no method to update [GE] Hydran M2 devices released prior to October 2014
[3].” Since adding cryptography to resource limited devices and keeping them patched is
infeasible and sometimes just impossible, alternative methods such as fingerprinting must
be used to provide security and intrusion detection.
Finally, standard approaches to intrusion detection and fingerprinting do not translate
well to ICS networks. Even though device fingerprinting is a well-studied topic with several
solutions already proposed, none of them until recent work [4] are properly suited for the
ICS environment. Typical active fingerprinting techniques, such as nmap [5], can achieve
2
high accuracy detection of operating systems and server versions, but require probing the
network with specially crafted packets. This solution is undesirable in an ICS environ-
ment where devices are performing time-critical functions and administrators would rather
not risk even the small chance of a port scan crashing the legacy devices and resulting in
critical system downtime that includes loss of revenue and potentially life-threatening sit-
uations for affected customers such as hospitals. Therefore passive techniques are more
suited, but they usually provide limited useful information or require special equipment or
TCP options enabled. The first ICS fingerprinting techniques discussed in previous work
proposed methods for fingerprinting both the physical actuators in the network and the
embedded computing devices. However, the physical fingerprinting techniques were only
demonstrated on a small subset of actuators and required several limiting assumptions.
Therefore, the overarching goal of this research was to develop novel device finger-
printing techniques to enhance intrusion detection capabilities in industrial control system
networks. This is accomplished by first summarizing related work in the area in Chapter
2 and providing a detailed characterization of real-world ICS network traffic in Chapter
3. Using the insight gained from the network characterization, various fingerprinting tech-
niques are then developed to provide comprehensive coverage of all important aspects of
ICS devices, both physical and software. Previous work on physical fingerprinting is ex-
tended in Chapter 4 followed by methods for fingerprinting embedded devices based on
their processing power. This idea is then extended in Chapter 5 to fingerprinting the pro-
grams on programmable logic controllers based on their execution times and providing
more robust guarantees by incorporating proof-of-work functions. Finally, conclusions





Previous work related to this research, while limited, can be divided into two broad cate-
gories of network characterization and ICS-specific intrusion detection and fingerprinting.
2.1 ICS Network Characterization
Most areas of networking research depend on a foundation of knowing the target networks’
behavior and traffic patterns, therefore it is crucial that detailed characterizations are regu-
larly conducted. These characterizations can provide insight on how to run a more efficient
and reliable network, help create more accurate simulation models, enable OS or browser
fingerprinting based on variations in protocol implementations [5] [6], and aid in the design
of more precise and effective anomaly based intrusion detection algorithms. Unfortunately,
until recently there has been little research published on the characterization of power sys-
tem networks and industrial control system traffic in general.
However, there has been significant research into various aspects of Internet traffic that
provides a solid foundation for this research. One of the first works to study Internet traffic
at a high level was achieved by Vern Paxson in 1999 when he published a study on the end-
to-end behavior of bulk TCP transfers across nodes on the Internet. His results included
observations on packet loss, out of order deliveries, bottleneck bandwidth, and packet repli-
cation, while offering keen insight into the causes of any abnormal behavior seen [7]. The
next major milestone in traffic characterization was in 2003 with the proposal of using GPS
synchronization to produce more detailed timing analysis. The study also found that the
traffic content flowing through the Internet had shifted to being a majority of file sharing
and media streaming as opposed to simple web sites [8].
One of the primary purposes of characterization of TCP traffic has always been to study
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possible techniques for congestion control and more efficient use of bandwidth. As the ap-
plications used by the average consumer constantly demand more and more bandwidth,
this is still as important as ever. However, this problem does not apply to ICS networks
where bandwidth requirements are at fixed low levels and nodes consist almost exclusively
of embedded devices. Even though we are becoming more and more reliant on intelli-
gent electronic devices that control physical entities, there have been very few studies on
how these specific types of networks perform. One of the earlier related works studied the
physical and link layers by simulating the effects of power substation noise on commonly
used wireless protocols such as WiFi and Zigbee [9]. Several years later, an in-depth char-
acterization of cellular machine-to-machine traffic was published by Shafiq et al., which
contained a small amount of power metering traffic and focused on comparing the behavior
of machine-to-machine communication with smart phone traffic over cellular networks by
taking measurements of round trip time, packet loss, and temporal patterns [10].
In the specific area of industrial control systems, there has only been limited research.
In 2012 a study was published that compared certain traffic characteristics of a water dis-
tribution facility with an example IT network dataset and found that the water facility did
not exhibit strong diurnal patterns like the IT dataset and that the flow sizes did not quite
fit the typical log-normal or Pareto distributions found in other Internet characterizations
[11]. Most closely related to this research was our previous traffic characterization of a
power substation network in 2014 that provided an important first look into what these
networks look like but only at a very high level [12]. Shortly afterward, a different study
focused on characterizing widespread TCP vulnerabilities found in power grid devices in
the same dataset[13]. This work differentiates itself from previous work by providing a
more detailed characterization over a longer capture period, comparing behavior across
multiple substations, and providing unique insight into how these observations can be used
to develop ICS-specific fingerprinting techniques.
5
2.2 ICS Network IDS
Device fingerprinting methods are usually classified into active or passive techniques de-
pending on whether they actively probe a device with specially crafted packets or passively
monitor network traffic to develop the fingerprint.
One of the oldest and most well known fingerprinting tools, Nmap, uses active finger-
printing techniques to gather information about devices on a network [5]. By sending a
series of specific requests, Nmap determines the OS and server versions running on a ma-
chine based on how the device responds. While this tool is invaluable for both pen-testers
and attackers on a “normal” network, it has limited use in an ICS network where active
methods are not as desirable.
For passive fingerprinting, a variety of techniques exist that provide both device type
fingerprinting and individual device fingerprinting. One example is the open source p0f
tool, which passively examines TCP and HTTP header fields to determine information
about a client, such as OS and browser version [6]. The first attempt at formalizing methods
for active and passive fingerprinting of network protocols was published in 2006, when
authors used parametrized extended finite state machine (PEFSMs) to model the behavior
of different protocol implementations [14]. Determining software versions is of some use,
but identifying individual devices on a network based on their hardware is even more useful,
which for example could be used for tracking a device across the Internet or intrusion
detection. Using both passive and active techniques, Kohno et al. produced the first such
work on individual device fingerprinting in 2005 by examining TCP timestamps to detect
individual device clock skew [15].
Other passive fingerprinting research has focused on various timing aspects of network
traffic to fingerprint devices and device types. In 2010 researchers were able to use wavelet
analysis on passively observed traffic flowing through access points to accurately identify
each access point [16]. The next year, another paper was published that described a method
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for device fingerprinting based on models of the timing of a device’s implementation of
application layer protocols using Temporal Random Parametrized Tree Extended Finite
State Machines (TR-FSMs) [17]. A third paper that used passive observations of network
traffic timing to achieve device fingerprinting was published in 2014, and used distributions
of packet inter-arrival times (IAT) to identify devices and device types [18].
Although these three papers all took different approaches to using passively observed
network traffic timing to perform fingerprinting, they are all infeasible for implementation
in an ICS network. The wavelet analysis approach was designed and tested only on wire-
less access points under heavy loads, a scenario that does not occur in ICS where wired
communication is preferred for its reliability and data rates are relatively low. The method
using TR-FSMs only looks at application layer behaviors and requires a large database of
all possible sessions. Finally, the method using distributions of IATs requires a large num-
ber (at least 2500) of training samples to achieve accurate results, but with some devices
on ICS networks being polled at an interval as large as a few seconds, this would result
in unacceptably slow operation. Another technique was developed that used timing mea-
surements of USB enumerations to fingerprint host devices [19], but this is also impractical
in the ICS environment where most devices do not have USB interfaces and where it is
desirable to passively fingerprint all devices on the network at once rather than driving out
to remote locations to fingerprint each individual device.
Another unique approach to passive device fingerprinting relevant to this work focused
on the physical layer of device communication, rather than the higher layers. Specifically,
researchers were able to use amplitude and phase measurements of the signals generated
by Wi-Fi radios to identify individual devices [20]. This may have been the first work to
use physical measurements to fingerprint devices, but it still is not feasible in ICS networks
where Wi-Fi devices are rarely used.
The first fingerprinting techniques to truly target ICS networks were developed as part
of the preliminary work for this research and was published in February 2016 [4]. In this
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work we proposed to fingerprint the control half of ICS traffic by the operation times of the
physical actuators and the data acquisition half by the times it took the devices to process
and respond to read requests. However, these techniques had several practical limitations
and only studied a small subset of devices
The proposed research will overcome the limitations of the previous work on ICS de-
vice fingerprinting by providing higher accuracy results using techniques more generally
applicable in the ICS environment. The first method will improve on the physical finger-
printing techniques by porting the algorithms to programmable logic controllers (PLCs),
which allows for more general ICS applications and removes network architecture limita-
tions. The second method will extend the ideas of fingerprints based on processing time to
the specific case of PLC programs.
The primary use of the proposed fingerprinting techniques would be to augment existing
IDS solutions, of which there is already a significant amount of previous work. One of
the first attempts at tailoring IDS methods for ICS and SCADA systems was proposed by
Idaho National Laboratories in 2008, and focused on monitoring traffic flows for regular
patterns and understanding packets at the application layer to look for intrusions [21]. Some
researchers have also approached the problem by modifying the popular Bro IDS software
to perform specification based intrusion detection for common ICS protocols [22]. Others
have attempted to model the states a process control system can enter and detect when a
command might cause it to enter a critical state [23] [24]. These solutions are able to detect
some types of attacks, but are unable to detect a class of stealthier ones called false data
injection attacks. To address this, some methods have been proposed for power system
state estimation [25] and for process control systems [26]. However, they are only useful
in the context of power state estimation or where the process behind the control system can
be accurately modeled.
Finally, while not specifically aimed at ICS devices, there have been several attempts
at leveraging the limited memory and processing power on general embedded devices to
8
perform remote software attestation. For example, one of the first and most well known
implementations of remote software attestation was presented in 2004 by Seshadri et al
[27]. In this implementation, the researchers develop techniques for attesting that the soft-
ware running on embedded microcontroller devices has not changed. This is accomplished
by a verifier regularly issuing challenges to a remote micro-controller device performing
a pseudo-random walk of the memory contents. If the checksum over the memory con-
tents fails, or if the response takes an exceedingly long time, then the verifier knows that
the program has changed. This technique was then extended to consider proxy attacks in
2010 [28]. While these were novel approaches that achieved impressive results, they are
infeasible for immediate deployment in ICS networks. The approach requires the device
under test to be able to read contents of the program memory, which is not made available
from the control program inside PLCs. This means that ICS vendors would have to release
modified versions of the firmware, which is extremely unlikely given the fact that many
still struggle to even implement basic passwords on the PLCs. The fingerprinting methods
proposed in this research offer novel approaches that are generic enough to be applied to







In recent years, the confluence of increasingly complex control systems and advancing in-
formation technology (IT) has resulted in a new class of networks, cyber-physical systems.
These networks in the form of industrial control systems (ICS) and supervisory control and
data acquisition (SCADA) systems, are used for a variety of applications ranging from deli-
cate manufacturing processes to critical infrastructures, such as power or water distribution
where safe and reliable operation is paramount. The protocols running on these networks
were often originally developed for dedicated serial communication lines and later adapted
for TCP/IP networks. Although these systems now communicate over networking proto-
cols familiar to the IT world, the true effect of the merging of these two technologies has
yet to be thoroughly studied, and as a result, most research in the area of cyber-physical
systems is based on artificial testbeds and theoretical assumptions that are not always ac-
curate.
Given the nature of what these systems are actually controlling, detailed knowledge
of how they truly behave is necessary for improved operation performance and develop-
ing defenses against a new class of cyber attack that could result in physical harm to both
equipment and personnel. Intrusion detection algorithms that perform well in lab experi-
ments and are based on assumptions about the target network do not always translate well
to real-world ICS networks where the nodes are comprised of a heterogeneous mix of de-
vices of varying ages and the network architecture and configuration are not as clean and
straightforward. Without published data on the size and intensity of bandwidth on these net-
works, security researchers designing these new intrusion detection systems cannot know
what kinds of throughput their algorithms must handle. Additionally, detailed understand-
ing of real-world ICS networks can lead to more accurate computer simulations and more
efficiently and robustly designed networks in the future.
To date there have been very few works that attempt to provide a detailed characteri-
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zation of ICS networks, primarily due to the culture of the industry being so resistant to
change and the issue of security only recently gaining popularity in the area. For this work,
we were given rare access to several live power substation networks and monitored the
traffic over an extended period of time to answer important questions about the character-
istics of real-world ICS networks. Specifically, the primary goal of this characterization
was to examine the accuracy of common assumptions that are made about ICS networks
and highlight any unusual behavior including observable security issues. A secondary goal
was then to determine, based on the observed traffic, whether TCP is well-matched to ICS
networks and whether any modifications could be made to improve the resiliency of remote
field devices and efficiency of their low powered hardware. The major contributions of this
chapter can be summarized as follows:
• The most in-depth traffic characterization of real-world live power substation net-
works to date
• A study of the stability of this characterization over 2.5 year’s time and minor changes
in architecture
• A comparison of behavior across multiple substations
• The discovery of several abnormal behaviors in the observed SCADA protocol stacks,
configurations, and real-time software
• Suggestions for modifying the TCP protocol to fit the needs of the ICS environment
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Background information on
SCADA networks is provided in Section 3.2 and an explanation of the experimental setup
used in this research is given in Section 3.3. Section 3.4 describes in detail the behavior
of one substation network over time and Section 3.5 compares the same behavior across
multiple substations. The implications of our findings are discussed in Section 3.6 and
finally our conclusions and next steps were summarized in Section 3.7.
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3.2 Background
In order to better understand the differences between ICS networks and IT networks, some
background information on SCADA and power grid networks is required. First, we de-
scribe the general operation of a SCADA system in a power distribution network to pro-
vide context about where the network traffic capture was taken. Figure 3.1 illustrates the
typical hierarchy where the control center (CC) communicates primarily with the remote
terminal unit (RTU) in each substation, and the RTU acts as a middle man between the
control center and intelligent electronic devices (IEDs) by collecting data from the IEDs
in the field, summarizing the data and reporting it back to the CC when requested. When
control operations are required, the CC sends the command to the RTU which forwards it
on to the correct IED. The most common SCADA protocols used to perform this kind of
communication include Modbus, GOOSE/IEC 61850, and DNP3, all of which collect data
in slightly different ways. Modbus, the oldest of the three, relies solely on regular polling
of measurement data, while DNP3 can operate in polling mode or spontaneous report-
ing mode. Finally, GOOSE operates on a publisher-subscriber philosophy by multicasting
event data throughout the network.
Figure 3.1: Typical SCADA hierarchy in a power distribution substation
The primary protocol used in this research was DNP3. The DNP3 protocol was orig-
inally developed for serial communication lines so it has its own complex protocol stack
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illustrated in Figure 3.2, that either sits directly on a serial line or is encapsulated by the
TCP/IP protocol suite. It is important to note that no matter the physical media on which
the protocol is deployed, the DNP3 stack still views communication as it would appear
on a serial line, as a stream of data. Therefore, the DNP3 data link layer performs frame
delimiting, error checking, and optional acknowledgments for reliable transmission. The
transport pseudo-layer primarily handles fragmentation of application layer fragments that
are too large for the maximum link layer size. Finally, the application layer handles larger
sized fragmentation, optional acknowledgments, and a wide variety of flexible functions
for SCADA system operation including data collection and control. DNP3 data collection
can be achieved through field devices spontaneously reporting important events, or as in
the case of this research, the DNP3 master implementing a polling schedule for all devices
[29].
Figure 3.2: DNP3 Protocol Stack
3.3 Experimental Setup
The datasets used in this research were captured at medium-voltage distribution substations
over the span of two and a half years, with roughly a year gap. During that gap, small
changes were made to the configuration and architecture of the network which allows us to
study how those changes affected the traffic measurements.
Figure 3.3a illustrates the architecture from which the first dataset was obtained. Under
this architecture, each substation has its own separate LAN, communication between the
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Table 3.1: Description of Datasets
Start End Size [GB] Nodes
A1 Sept. 2013 Feb. 2014 21.7 204
A2 Jan. 2015 Aug. 2015 146.4 317
A3 Aug. 2015 April 2016 147 517
B 10 Aug. ’15 11 Aug. ’15 0.34 118
C April 2016 May 2016 5.7 129
D April 2016 May 2016 11.7 167
CC and RTU was over a third-party frame relay service, and DNP3 polling intervals were
much slower than in the second dataset. The traffic was captured in the substation close
to the RTU so all communication between the CC, RTU, and IEDs in the field could be
monitored. The capture setup in Figure 3.3b is different in that all substations were moved
to the same LAN, a new switch was installed that allowed port mirroring, communication
between the CC and RTU used a dedicated fiber backbone, and the DNP3 polling intervals
were much faster than the first dataset. Table 3.1 summarizes the basic statistics about the
datasets, where datasets A1, A2, and A3 are taken from the same substation and the others
are taken from separate substations on the same network. The change from using a third
party frame relay service to having a private fiber backbone would theoretically increase
the speed and reliability of the communication between the CC and each substation. Fur-
thermore, while data on the old router’s processing and switching delay is unavailable, it is
relatively safe to assume that the brand new, higher end switch is able to process packets
at a higher speed reducing the switching delay for packets on the network. Finally, the
change from having each substation on its own LAN to logically combining them on the
same LAN should have little effect on the traffic observed at the specified measurement
points, except for potentially seeing some traffic from nearby substations.
3.4 Stability Over Time
The first half of this characterization studies the evolution of a substation’s behavior over
a long period of time using datasets A1 and A2 to determine how stable the measurements
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(a) A1 Network Architecture
(b) Network Architecture for All Other Datasets
Figure 3.3: Experimental Setup
were.
3.4.1 High Level Behavior
To first study the network traffic at the highest level of abstraction, patterns in metadata
such as timing and bandwidth usage were examined.
Traffic Volume. As explained in Section 3.1, the two primary functions of any ICS or
SCADA system are data acquisition and control. Consequently, the networks are assumed
to have very clear communication relationships where the bulk of the traffic is generated
from field devices regularly reporting data to the master and the master occasionally send-
ing commands as needed. Although it varies by the exact SCADA protocol used, this is
especially true with the DNP3 protocol where there are strict master/slave relationships
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Table 3.2: Bandwidth statistics averaged over ten-second samples
A1 A2
µ [kbps] 11.2 58.8
σ [kbps] 7.7 860.2
Max [kbps] 1925 278931
Min [kbps] 1.11 52.1
Table 3.3: Average Packet Sizes
A1 A2
µ [bytes] 89.9 96.5
σ [bytes] 91.3 107.6
and the IEDs never communicate with each other. To test whether the bandwith is low and
stable, as would be expected from polling traffic, bandwidth samples were taken every ten
seconds and summarized in Table 3.2.
The results confirmed that indeed, the network uses very little bandwidth on average at
11kbps and 58kbps for A1 and A2 respectively of the 100Mbps links and with little varia-
tion. The bandwidth usage increased between datasets due to a configuration change that
increased the polling frequency of devices for measurements. Another interesting observa-
tion is the maximum bandwidth usage in both datasets appear to be caused by temporary
switching loops and subsequent broadcast storms.
As a result of the constant polling for measurements, and the device often having no
signficant events to report, the average packet sizes remain rather small, as described in
Table 3.3.
Regularity of Traffic. Popular ICS protocols including DNP3 and Modbus rely on reg-
ular polling of measurement data to ensure that the system is operating as intended. DNP3
in particular uses a combination of faster event polls to monitor for exceptions, such as
voltages crossing a certain threshold, and slower static polls to monitor the exact status of
all measurements over time. These polls are initiated by devices running real-time oper-
ating systems and are often configured with the real-time control constraints in mind, i.e.
certain measurements have to be updated so often in order maximize efficiency or respond
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to emergencies in time. Therefore, one might assume that the polling intervals would be
very regular with low jitter, but this was not the case. Figure 3.4 illustrates the event and
static polling intervals for all devices in datasets A1 and A2. Note that all polls were ini-
tiated by the RTUs running VxWorks, a popular real-time operating system that provides
hard real-time guarantees. Minimum and maximum polling intervals varied drastically due
to broadcast storms and devices going silent, and even during normal operation polling in-
tervals had standard deviations on the order of several seconds despite the real-time nature
of the RTU. To verify that this behavior was not caused by network issues, polling intervals
were also calculated by the TCP timestamp ticks in the poll requests coming from the RTU,
which were generated by the real-time operating system. Indeed, Figure 3.5 illustrates how
the poll requests being generated by the software running on the real-time operating system
in the RTU exhibits similar irregularities.
To study another aspect of the regularity of the traffic, the inter-arrival times of packets
at the capture point were measured and are shown in Figure 3.6. The distributions from
both datasets appear to be approximately the same, and the most interesting feature is
small periodic spikes every 17ms that dampen exponentially. While the cause for these
spikes is still unclear, we speculate that it is most likely originating in the RTU since it
initiates all communication with the IEDs. One possible explanation is the use of a very
coarse grained timer to decide when to send the next polling request, but other explanations
are just as likely to be the true cause. It is also interesting to note that the traffic intensity
of the network is so low that inter-arrival times occasionally reach as high as one second.
Availability. One interesting aspect that differentiates ICS networks from traditional
IT networks is the consequences of node down-time. If a set of nodes is unavailable for a
period of time in an IT network, either due to network issues or device issues, revenue and
productivity will be lost but no physical harm will be done. However in the ICS environ-
ment, every minute that a node is down increases the risk that a critical issue that requires
attention will go unnoticed. In the case of the power grid, this could be as innocuous as lost
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revenue from wasteful energy production when demand has fallen, or as devastating as loss
of power to parts of the grid due to increased consumption and lack of available power.
Figure 3.7 illustrates the idle times for individual devices with the RTU separated from
the IEDs. For the first dataset, the distributions show that the RTU never appears to lose
availability for long, but surprisingly some IEDs appear to go down for up to 10 days at
a time. It is unclear from manual inspection of the network traffic if these devices were
intentionally taken out of commission for maintenance or technical problems brought them
down. Devices in the second dataset demonstrate similar behavior.
3.4.2 TCP Level Behavior
In addition to unexpected patterns in high level metadata, unusual behavior was also ob-
served in the common network protocols that have been adapted from the IT world into
use for the ICS environment, and it was found that some of the most crucial improvements
to TCP that allow modern web traffic today are largely irrelevant in the context of ICS
networks.
TCP Flow Duration and Size Although previous work has studied TCP flow sizes for
Internet traffic [30] and for water distribution networks [11], data on power grid TCP flow
sizes has yet to be published. Studies of Internet traffic suggested that flow durations have
long tailed distributions and follow log-normal and Pareto distributions. The characteriza-
tion of the water facility found similar results for some types of flows, but others exhibited
too much variance. The general conclusion that the research was able to draw was that all
types of flows observed at the water facility were positively skewed, meaning most values
fell within a main body in the distribution but there were a significant number of extreme
large values.
Water distribution facilities are another example of industrial control system networks
not unlike the power substation networks studied here, so similar results were expected to
be found. From a purely theoretical perspective, most flows were expected to be very long
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lived similar to an extreme persistent HTTP connection, due to the connections staying
open for the constant polling for measurements. Few shorter flows were expected to repre-
sent the occasional configuration or manual maintenance. However, results obtained from
the substation network exhibited high variance due to a variety of configuration issues at
the application layer and network layer, illustrated in Figures 3.8 and 3.9.
The most striking feature of the A1 distribution is the overwhelmingly large body cen-
tered around a 100 second duration. After closer inspection, the cause of this was deter-
mined to be a misconfiguration of all devices on one of the circuits in the network. The
issue stemmed from the fact that the RTU was configured to poll for DNP3 event data every
100 seconds for each device in this circuit, but either the IEDs themselves or the switches in
the network were configured to close the connection with a FIN handshake after 30 seconds
of being idle. After acknowledging the FIN packet from the IED, the RTU never sends its
own FIN to gracefully close the connection and instead waits another 80 seconds, attempts
to send another DNP3 poll request and gets a TCP reset flag in response. This type of
disagreement in the TCP connection termination was actually so rampant in the network
that 99.8% of all flows were terminated with a TCP reset flag instead of the full graceful
FIN handshake.
The second most noticeable spike (largely overshadowed in Figure 3.8 is the flow dura-
tions on the order of 10 seconds, corresponding to relatively short flows from maintenance
access to various devices. Finally, the relatively large number of extremely short duration
flows appeared to mostly come from a brief disruption where the switches were caught in
a broadcast loop and UDP messages flooded the network causing connection issues. Other
extremely short flows appear to be caused by occasional strange behavior where the RTU
becomes temporarily inactive and refuses connection attempts by the control center.
When the network was revisited over a year later in dataset A2, again, large amounts
of extremely short flows were a result of another broadcast storm. However, as a result of
the faster DNP3 polling, the overwhelming spike at 100 seconds no longer appears because
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the IEDs are never idle for 30 seconds. Instead, this reveals another strange configuration
issue evidenced by the large spike at around 20 seconds. After manual inspection of the
traffic, the cause of this new spike appeared to be an implementation issue at the firmware
layer. At several points in both datasets, the RTU closes all connections with the IEDs for a
short period and refuses connection attempts from the control center. In one of these cases,
when the connection is restarted with a specific IED, the IED sends the RTU a DNP3
“Request Link Status” message. The message is acknowledged by the TCP layer at the
RTU, but apparently ignored at the application layer. While normal DNP3 data collection
is successfully taking place, the IED retries this message several times without getting a
reply and finally closes the connection after about 20 seconds apparently with the mistaken
belief that the connection is broken at the application layer. The connection is continually
restarted following this same pattern throughout the rest of the dataset and is never resolved.
As a result of one configuration issue being corrected and another one appearing, the total
percentage of TCP flows closed by reset flags in the second dataset was 87.03%.
To compare the distributions with previous work suggesting TCP flows follow log-
normal and Pareto distributions, all data was fit to both log-normal and Pareto distributions
using Maximum Likelihood Estimation of the parameters. The resulting theoretical dis-
tributions were compared with the empirical ones in Q-Q plots (Figures 3.10 and 3.11) to
qualitatively test for similarities, noting that the closer Q-Q plots resemble the green line
y = x the closer their distributions are. Also note that extreme outlier quantiles were omit-
ted to allow for detailed examination of the main body of the distributions. Clearly, the
large spikes caused by the observed undesirable behavior prevent the empirical distribu-
tions from matching any of the theoretical ones.
Round Trip Times Another notable characteristic of ICS networks is that they consist
of devices in fixed locations in the same geographic area as opposed to mobile devices
constantly on the move or devices communicating over large distances. Therefore, based
on knowledge from traditional IT networks one might think at first that the round trip
21
Table 3.4: RTT Statistics
Between
RTU and µA1 [ms] σA1 [ms] µA2 [ms] σA2
Type A.1a 18.7 7.4 18.9 22.2
Type A.1b 17.9 8.12 21.1 22.6
Type A.2 18.8 7.13 23.5 47.9
Type B 1.4 1.6 58.7 188
CC 3.2 1.9 9.0 2.94
times (RTTs) would be small and consistent, since they should not be affected by changing
locations, different routes over the Internet, or long propagation delays.
As explained in Section 3.3, the measurement point for our experiments was close to
the substation’s RTU, therefore to test assumptions about round trip times, RTTs between
the RTU and field devices were measured from the dataset by recording the time between
the SYN and SYN-ACK packets in the TCP handshake and the RTT between the RTU and
IP addresses associated with the control center were calculated from the time between the
SYN-ACK and final ACK in the three-way handshake. RTT measurements taken during a
brief broadcast storm in the network were discarded due to being extreme outliers (round
trip times of greater than four seconds).
As Figure 3.12 and Table 3.4 illustrate, the RTTs are neither small nor consistent. Al-
though this may be counter-intuitive at first, it can easily be explained by the fundamental
differences in the make-up of legacy ICS networks and current-day IT networks. The typi-
cal IT network consists of large numbers of relatively powerful end devices capable of pro-
cessing and creating large amounts of data that must be sent over communication lines that
are heavily constrained by bandwidth and propagation delay. Due to this imbalance of large
load generation capability and small network bottleneck size, IT networks would quickly
experience congestion collapse without implementing congestion control algorithms [31].
However, in ICS networks the imbalance leans in the opposite direction. The networks
consist of low powered embedded devices where it is not uncommon to be running 16-
bit microcontroller processors in the tens to low hundreds of MHz range and very limited
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RAM. The communication distances at most are no bigger than a few miles resulting in
propagation delays that are fractions of a millisecond. Additionally, the link bandwidths
are typically over-provisioned for availability and reliability reasons (e.g., the observed
network only utilized roughly 0.02% of the 100Mbps link). This imbalance suggests that
the observed RTTs are largely dominated by the processing time of the end devices rather
than the propagation and queuing delay across the links.
Another interesting observation from this comparison is the difference in consistency
between the two types of RTTs. Even though the ICS network’s traffic intensity was very
light, meaning that the network switches should never have been heavily loaded, and the
packets always took the same path, the RTTs were surprisingly much more erratic com-
pared to the RTTs over the unpredictable Internet. RTTs measured over the Internet typ-
ically have standard deviations on the order of a few milliseconds. By comparison, the
RTTs measured in the ICS network were widely varying with standard deviations in the
tens and even hundreds of milliseconds, and it was a regular occurrence to have RTTs as
large as three seconds.
In order to study whether the cause of the irregularity in RTTs originated in the network
or the field devices themselves, we compare the different RTTs in Table 3.4. The last row
contains statistics for communication between the RTU in the substation to IP addresses
associated with the control center. This communication is carried wirelessly over a third
party frame relay service across a distance (about 20 miles) that is roughly ten times the
communication distance between the RTU and the IEDs over fiber. The devices in the con-
trol center that communicate with the RTU are all relatively modern PCs capable of quickly
processing the TCP handshake, resulting in a standard deviation of RTTs that is expectedly
smaller than any of the measured Internet RTTs or other ICS device RTTs. The fact that this
link, even with its longer distance and less predictable wireless communication medium,
has more stable RTTs than the links between the RTU and field devices further suggests
that the embedded device processing time dominates the observed network performance
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rather than the network infrastructure itself.
Finally, given such strong evidence that the RTT is largely dependent on the processing
time of the embedded devices, it suggests that measuring the RTT could supply informa-
tion about the identity of the device, similar to the cross layer response time fingerprinting
methods proposed in [4]. Indeed, Figure 3.12 shows strong clusters for different physical
device types, with Device Types A.1a and A.1b being the same hardware and Type A.2
being only a slightly different model hardware. Furthermore, these device types were not
clustered by location and were quite spread out, ruling out any significant effects of prop-
agation delay and switching delay. For example, these devices ranged from being at the
substation close to the measurement point and traversing only one network switch, to being
up to a couple miles away traversing upwards of thirty network switches.
With the change in architecture, upgrading of the main switch in the substation, and
correction of some of the configuration issues, the RTTs appeared to be less variable, but
still exhibited similar means and clusters compared to the first dataset, as illustrated in
Figure 3.13 and Table 3.4, with samples taken during two broadcast storms omitted due to
extreme outliers. In this dataset, the device types seem to be even more heavily clustered
based on the mean and variance of the RTTs.
TCP Retransmissions Throughout the duration of a TCP conversation, both ends keep
estimates of the RTT from their perspectives in order to calculate a retransmit time-out
(RTO) that reduces the chances of wasting bandwidth on retransmissions of data that would
have eventually arrived. In Paxson’s large scale study [7] involving two captures one year
apart of bulk transfers across the Internet, he found that 1% and 2% of the packets observed
in the first and second captures respectively were redundant retransmissions. Of these re-
dundant retransmissions, 44% and 17% respectively were deemed to be unavoidable due to
the loss of a segment or all acknowledgments of the segment. The majority of the remain-
ing redundant retransmissions could have been avoided using selective acknowledgments
(SACK) [32], and only a small percentage (4% and 3%) could have been avoided with a
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better RTO value.
Given the differences between the local power substation network and the complex In-
ternet, the retransmission performance at the power substation network was expected to
be significantly better. The combination of the low datarate (0.02% average traffic inten-
sity), small packet size, and dedicated fiber links at the substation suggests that packet
loss should be virtually non-existent and that queuing delays should be small and stable
resulting in RTOs that prevent unnecessary retransmissions. However, as the results in the
previous section about RTT illustrated, the low-powered embedding processing time ap-
pears to have a significant impact on the network performance including retransmissions.
As explained in Section 3.3, data was collected only at one location in the network
so it is impossible to conclusively determine if a data segment and its ACK were actually
received by the corresponding ends, as was the case in Paxson’s study. However, given the
low traffic intensity (0.02%) on the substation network it is highly unlikely that any packets
were actually dropped due to congestion rather than just delayed by slow processing. To
elaborate, given that the observed average packet size of 90 bytes has a transmission time
of 7µs on a 100Mbps link and that the observed average time between packet arrival for
the entire network is significantly greater at 65ms, the outgoing rate at which each switch
can push packets on the line is much greater than the incoming rate of arriving packets.
Therefore, the average packet should experience roughly zero queuing delay, packet loss
should be virtually nonexistent, and almost every observed retransmission could have been
avoided.
Even though the retransmission performance was expected to be significantly better
on the substation network compared to Paxson’s study, Table 3.5 shows only marginal
improvements. The substation network had an average hourly retransmission percentage
of 0.5% which reached as high as 2.86% during one hour, compared to Paxson’s 1% and
2% over the Internet. Of these observed retransmissions 43.2% of them occurred after the
acknowledgment for the original segment had already traversed the measurement point.
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Table 3.5: Hourly Retransmission Statistics
µtotal σtotal µACK σACK
A1 0.510% 0.0951% 43.2% 5.77%
A2 1.46% 0.501% 26.6% 2.35%
Since it is unlikely that the acknowledgment was dropped anywhere in the network, the
cause of these avoidable retransmissions had to be due to the sender’s RTO expiring before
the acknowledgment could reach it.
To examine why the overall retransmission rate was so unexpectedly high, retransmis-
sion percentages were calculated based on IP address pairs and classified by direction in the
Q-Q plot in Figure 3.14a. Note that if the retransmission patterns for packets originating
from the RTU were equal to those destined to the RTU, then the Q-Q plot would roughly
follow the line, y = x. Interestingly, the retransmissions were not evenly distributed among
device pairs due to some devices having high overall retransmission rates (as high as 15%)
and others having much more reasonable rates of around 0.1%. The shape of the Q-Q plot
falling so far below the line y = x suggests that packets originating from the IEDs in the
field were retransmitted at much higher rates than in the opposite direction. When studied
further, it was found that the IP address pairs suffering from higher retransmission rates
were located in the same electrical cabinets connected to the same switches, suggesting a
possible malfunction or misconfiguration of some of the network switches. Other causes
for poor performance could originate from the noisy electrical environment the devices are
subjected to, despite being hardened against such conditions.
Another important observation to be made from Figure 3.14a is the imbalance between
directions of the retransmissions. On closer inspection, it was found that the field devices
retransmitted much more frequently to the RTU than the RTU retransmitted to the field
devices, suggesting two very different measured RTTs or different calculations of the RTO.
The results from Dataset A2 in Figure 3.14b suggested similar conclusions about un-
even retransmissions and offered other interesting observations as well with some IP pairs
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having a majority of their conversation be retransmissions. When examined manually, this
seemed to originate from some IP addresses apparently located in other substations in the
network rarely showing up in normal operation but appearing and being retransmitted a
number of times during the two broadcast storms. It is also interesting to note that the
average retransmission rate increased to 1.45% with the new changes, most likely due to
the increased bandwidth usage and more frequent queuing delays.
While it was impossible to accurately measure the RTO for all devices with only one
network tap, estimates were made based on the arrival time difference between the orig-
inal transmission and the subsequent retransmissions. Note that the data in Figure 3.15
excludes the extreme long tails at 64 seconds in order to offer insight into the minimum
RTOs implemented by the different operating systems of the devices on the network. The
original specifications for TCP did not clearly define a minimum RTO, but later RFCs rec-
ommended a minimum of 1 second or 3 seconds if no RTT measurement has been made
yet [33]. This was further updated in 2011 with a modified recommendation to use 1 sec-
ond if no RTT measurement has been made [34]. Both RFCs state that smaller RTOs may
perform better, and it has been noted that several operating systems do use smaller values
and that they can increase performance [35].
The clusters around 1 second and 3 seconds appear to primarily come from the RTU,
and align with the behavior specified in the RFCs. Most of the retransmissions originating
from the RTU have an RTO between 1 and 1.5 seconds, and for the short lived connections
discussed in Section 3.4.2, it appears to use 3 seconds since it never has a chance to get an
RTT estimate. The other clusters around 300ms and 200ms align with the observed RTOs
used by modern Windows and Linux machines respectively, but the 100ms cluster and
large number of RTOs below 10ms were unexpected. Since it is unlikely that these legacy
devices are actually using faster minimum RTOs than more modern OSes, we suspect that
packet timing compression is happening somewhere along the network or even in the slow
processing of the field device itself.
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Although it is difficult to see in the figure, the RTU is also observed to double its RTO
as specified in the RFC until it reaches a set maximum at 64 seconds where it retries several
more times before finally giving up.
Exact RTO behavior is vendor specific which means distributions from different net-
works will undoubtedly differ from those presented here. However, two important conclu-
sions can be drawn from this data that do generalize to other ICS networks. The first is
that due to the use of proprietary application specific OSes and slow update cycles, there
is much more inherent diversity in the TCP implementations seen in ICS networks than a
typical corporate network consisting primarily of modern Windows and Mac systems. The
second conclusion reinforces what was discussed in the previous section in that the slow
processing time of the embedding field devices dominates that network performance rather
than the network infrastructure.
The results from Dataset A2 in Figure 3.15 produced similar results.
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Figure 3.4: Polling Intervals
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Figure 3.5: Polling Intervals from TCP Timestamps
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Figure 3.6: A1 and A2 packet inter-arrival times at the measurement point
Figure 3.7: Idle Times of Devices on the Network
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Figure 3.8: A1 and A2 TCP Flow Durations
Figure 3.9: A1 and A2 TCP Flow Sizes
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(a) A1 Flow Duration Q-Q Plots
(b) A1 Flow Size Q-Q Plots
Figure 3.10: A1 Q-Q Plots
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(a) A2 Flow Duration Q-Q Plots
(b) A2 Size Duration Q-Q Plots
Figure 3.11: A2 Q-Q Plots
34
Figure 3.12: A1 mean and standard deviation of round trip times for each device
Figure 3.13: A2 mean and standard deviation of round trip times for each device
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(a) Q-Q plot of A1 retransmission per flow, comparing di-
rections to and from the RTU
(b) Q-Q plot of A2 retransmission per flow, comparing di-
rections to and from the RTU
Figure 3.14: Imbalanced direction of retransmissions
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Figure 3.15: A1 and A2 RTO Behavior Less than 32 Seconds
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3.5 Comparison Across Substations
After conducting the previous longitudinal study at a single substation, behavior across
multiple substations was examined to determine how general the previous observations
were. A third dataset from the first substation was compared with data from three other
substations on the power system network.
3.5.1 High Level Behavior
Comparing differences in behavior at the highest level of abstraction, such as bandwidth
usage and packet size, across substations provides insight into how active and connected in
the power grid each substation is.
Traffic Volume When similar bandwidth measurements are taken as in Section 3.4.1,
the new results, in Table 3.6, lead to similar observations. Again, the average bandwidth
usage is low in the tens of kilobits per second, and another broadcast storm caused large
spikes of traffic in A3.
Table 3.6: Bandwidth statistics averaged over ten-second samples
A3 B C D
µ [kbps] 48.2 34.1 15.9 33.1
σ [kbps] 232.7 1.44 1.17 1.01
Max [kbps] 224503 46.6 45.2 103.4
Min [kbps] 0 29.2 0 25.5
The average packet sizes in Table 3.7 were again small due to the polling nature of
the traffic, with the only significant differences between substations being the standard
deviation of the sizes. This could be explained by the lack of broadcast storms in the shorter
datasets B, C, and D, or possibly a sign of how often devices in the field have important
events to report back to the master.
Regularity of Traffic Polling interval jitter was again observed across all substations
from both network tap timestamps and timestamps from the RTUs at each substation, illus-
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Table 3.7: Packet Sizes
A3 B C D
µ [kbps] 82.2 78.1 78.5 80.0
σ [kbps] 52.9 34.9 37.1 29.2
trated in Figures 3.16 and 3.17.
When the inter-arrival times of packets at each of the substations were plotted in Figure
3.18, again the unexplained spikes at 17ms intervals are present in each one. It can also
be noted that the busier substations with more devices on their networks have more short
inter-arrival times simply due to the presence of more traffic.
Availability Examining the idle times of the RTUs and IEDs in Figure 3.19 reveals
similar behavior with IEDs going quiet for surprisingly long periods of time. For example,
from Dataset A3 a few devices were not heard from for several days while device idle times
from Datasets C and D maxed out around 10 minutes of idle time.
3.5.2 TCP Level Behavior
Measurements made at the TCP level across substations revealed more evidence of config-
uration issues and confirmed observations made about the round trip times being largely
due to processing delay.
TCP Flow Duration and Size Given that the ideal TCP flow for a control system
environment would be as long lived as possible to reduce latency, evidence of similar con-
figuration issues can be seen in Figures 3.20 and 3.21. For example, the same spike at 20
seconds is still present in Dataset A3, and the other substations in Datasets C and D still
are plagued with numerous short duration flows. Plots for Dataset B have been omitted
because of the short duration preventing any useful observations. Again all distributions
were fit to Pareto and log-normal distributions using MLE and illustrated on Q-Q plots to
qualitatively test for distribution fitness. Note that extreme outlier quantiles were omitted
again to allow for closer examination of the main body, and again the anomalous behavior
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prevents the empirical distributions from fitting any of the theoretical ones.
Table 3.8: Round Trip Time Means
Between
RTU and µA3 [ms] µC [ms] µD [ms]
Type A.1a 18.1 - 17.4
Type A.1b 17.4 - 12.5
Type A.2 19.0 20.3 17.2
Type B 1.6 0.4 -
CC 5.4 4.5 7.2
Table 3.9: Round Trip Time Standard Deviations
Between
RTU and σA3 [ms] σC [ms] σD [ms]
Type A.1a 7.35 7.4 8.3
Type A.1b 7.74 8.12 5.8
Type A.2 7.26 7.13 7.6
Type B 2.86 2.86 -
CC 2.8 2.8 1.6
Round Trip Times Due to the shorter capture times, no TCP SYN handshakes were ob-
served in Dataset B, and only certain device types were observed in Datasets C and D. The
remaining results in Table 3.8 and Table 3.9 do however support the previous observation
that RTTs are surprisingly large and variable. Furthermore, the fact that the measurements
are so similar with device types even across substation networks further suggests that they
are primarily dependent on device processing time rather than network architecture.
Table 3.10: Hourly Retransmission Statistics
µtotal σtotal µACK σACK
A3 1.32% 0.33% 24.1% 2.21%
B 0.858% 0.016% 37.5% 0.975%
C 0.298% 0.022% 74.8% 5.25%
D 1.17% 0.027% 28.6% 0.456%
TCP Retransmissions Similar high retransmission rates were seen across all substa-
tions with the notable exception where the smallest substation, Dataset C, had only 0.298%
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of all packets retransmitted. Although omitted here due to space constraints, retransmis-
sions were again uneven between the master and field devices due to the apparent widely
different calculations of the RTO.
Since the same device types are used in all of the substations, they all use the same RTO
calculation algorithms resulting in similar RTO distributions in Figure 3.25, with noticeable
clusters at 1 second, 3 seconds, and 300ms.
3.6 Discussion
Based on the measurements taken during this research, three major areas of discussion and
impact arise.
ICS Network and Device Implementations Throughout the course of this research,
one of the recurring observations made was that there were widespread implementation
issues causing non-ideal network performance. Although the dataset used in this research
is not large enough to conclusively determine how many other ICS networks suffer similar
issues, the problems appear in several popular vendors and in multiple layers of the proto-
col stack suggesting that it is most likely indeed a widespread problem. Examples of the
variety of issues observed in this dataset include overwhelmingly large numbers of TCP
connections closing ungracefully, broadcast storms occurring despite the use of the span-
ning tree protocol, and disagreements in the implementation of DNP3 resulting in TCP
connections being unnecessarily closed. Other interesting observations revealed surprising
amount of jitter in the polling intervals initiated by software running on one of the most
popular real-time operating systems in the world.
Since there are clearly efficiency issues in the implementations of the protocol stacks in
these devices, it also suggests a strong likelihood of the presence of security vulnerabilities.
In fact, a study conducted in 2014 found widespread vulnerabilities in power grid devices
[13], and through the course of this research multiple ICS-CERT advisories were also re-
leased [36] [3] [37]. The fact that so many devices are still plagued with easily observable
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vulnerabilities that have been around for decades highlights how vulnerable these networks
are and how much more attention should be paid to them.
Usage of TCP The second main observation this research offered was that due to the
steady low bandwidth requirements of embedded ICS devices, the TCP protocol performs
several functions that are completely unnecessary, including congestion control. Com-
bined with the fact that storage space and processing power are both very limited on these
devices, it could be very desirable to leave these functions out. The official DNP3 spec-
ification even recommends that it may be more efficient to use UDP as opposed to TCP
when implemented over LANs where packet reordering is not present. However, if reli-
able transmission is required, then the DNP3 level acknowledgments and retransmissions
would have to be used, which have not been as thoroughly studied as TCP retransmission
algorithms. Due to these reasons then it may be desirable to make a compromise between
efficiency and functionality and use a stripped down version of TCP/IP like uIP developed
by Adam Dunkels [38].
Round Trip Times The final and perhaps the most interesting observation is that tra-
ditional RTT estimation, and by extension traditional TCP retransmission algorithms, do
not perform as expected in ICS environments due to the slow processing of the embedded
devices. This resulted in significant redundant retransmissions and wasted bandwidth that
could have been saved if a smarter RTO algorithm was used. Furthermore, as a result of the
RTTs being so dependent on processing as opposed to propagation and queuing delay, it
appears that measuring RTTs reveals information as to the device’s processing power and
identity. As the Internet of Things continues to grow with ubiquitous embedded devices,
this observation could be crucial to reducing redundant retransmissions and possibly even
be leveraged for device fingerprinting and intrusion detection.
Generality Being a case study, by definition, this research only focused on the net-
works of a single ICS. However, several of the most interesting observations have nothing
to do with the specifics of power substations and hold true for any network of embedded
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devices, including other ICSs. Embedded devices by their nature are designed to perform
very specific tasks, which results in limited processing power and memory and equiva-
lently, limited capability for generating large amounts of traffic. Furthermore, when they
are running application layer protocols designed to regularly poll for measurements, it vir-
tually guarantees a constant bandwidth usage and packet size. When these devices, which
are still often designed to be compatible slow legacy serial links, are networked together
with common IT technology capable of speeds of 100Mbps and greater, traditional notions
of round trip times and critical concerns for congestion control no longer hold.
3.7 Conclusions
In this chapter we present the most detailed characterization of power substation network
traffic to date and examine how well the behavior of the target networks align with common
assumptions about ICS and SCADA systems. We found that while most assumptions held
true, there was also a surprising amount of unexpected behavior including slow and variable
round trip times dominated by processing time, relatively high retransmission rates, and
polling intervals with large jitter. Furthermore, evidence suggested that most of the various
functions that TCP provides, including congestion control, are largely irrelevant in the ICS
environment. These insights and observations are crucial to creating more accurate ICS
network simulations and inspiring several areas of new research. Finally, it was observed
that devices were heavily clustered based on their RTTs, no matter how far away they
were from the master device. This suggests that the processing power on these resource-
starved embedded devices could be leveraged for identifying information that is necessary
for fingerprinting. This idea is studied further in Chapter 4 and expanded further in Chapter
5.
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Figure 3.16: Polling Intervals
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Figure 3.17: Polling Intervals from TCP Timestamps
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Figure 3.18: CDF of Packet Inter-Arrival Times
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Figure 3.19: CCDFs of RTU and IED Idle Times
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Figure 3.20: TCP Flow Durations
Figure 3.21: TCP Flow Sizes
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Figure 3.22: A3 Q-Q Plots
49
Figure 3.23: C Q-Q Plots
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Figure 3.24: D Q-Q Plots
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Fingerprinting devices on a target network, whether it is based on their software or hard-
ware, can provide network administrators with mechanisms for intrusion detection or en-
able adversaries to conduct surveillance in preparation for a more sophisticated attack. In
the context of industrial control systems (ICS), where a cyber-based compromise can lead
to physical harm to both man and machine, these mechanisms become even more impor-
tant. An attacker intruding on an ICS network can theoretically inject false data or com-
mands and drive the system into an unsafe state. Example consequences of such an intru-
sion can range from widespread blackouts in the power grid [1] to environmental disasters
caused by tampering with systems carrying water, sewage [2], oil, or natural gas. These
false data and command injections could be thwarted using strong cryptographic protocols
that provide integrity and authentication guarantees, but in ICS networks it is often infeasi-
ble to upgrade legacy equipment to provide them due to lack of processing power, devices
being in remote locations, and the critical nature of the systems that must be online at all
times. In fact, some vendors do not even support the functionality of upgrading devices to
install critical patches. When our previous research found vulnerabilities in several power
system devices and they were reported to ICS-CERT, the resulting official advisory for one
of the products stated that “There is no method to update [GE] Hydran M2 devices re-
leased prior to October 2014 [39].” Since adding cryptography to resource limited devices
and keeping them patched is infeasible and sometimes just impossible, alternative methods
such as fingerprinting must be used to provide security and intrusion detection.
While device fingerprinting is a well-studied topic with several solutions already pro-
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posed, none of them until recent work [4] were properly suited for the ICS environment.
Active fingerprinting techniques can achieve high accuracy detection of operating systems
and server versions, but require probing the network with specially crafted packets. This
solution is undesirable in an ICS environment where devices are performing time-critical
functions and administrators would rather not risk even the small chance of a port scan
crashing the legacy devices and resulting in critical system downtime that includes loss
of revenue and potentially life-threatening situations for affected customers such as hospi-
tals. Therefore passive techniques are more suited, but they usually provide limited useful
information or require special equipment or TCP options enabled.
This chapter presents some of the defining characteristics of ICS networks and discusses
how to use them to develop two fingerprinting approaches that perform uniquely well in
the ICS environment, where the two primary functions are data acquisition and control and
are carried out over supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) protocols such as
DNP3, Modbus, and IEC 61850 GOOSE. Our first fingerprinting approach uses the con-
trol aspects of ICS environments to extend previous work on generating signatures from
the physical operations being taken by the physical devices on the network. Even though
two relays or valves from different vendors may have similar ratings, there will always be
physical variations in their construction resulting in fundamental differences in their oper-
ation times. These differences are then used to identify device types or spoofed command
responses, which we call physical fingerprinting. The basics of this idea was recently pro-
posed in previous work [4], but was limited in scope and accuracy by several assumptions.
In this chapter we significantly improve on the work by removing these assumptions and
drastically increase the accuracy and scalability. Our second approach takes advantage of
the data acquisition functions by using the interaction between the application layer re-
sponses and transport layer acknowledgments to obtain measures estimating the speed and
workload of a particular intelligent electronic device (IED). Due to the unique properties
of ICS networks, the distributions of these measurements are constant within device types
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Figure 4.1: The two novel fingerprinting methods can work together to augment traditional
intrusion detection
and software configurations allowing network administrators to passively detect changes
in the configuration or spoofed communication. Throughout this work we refer to this
technique as cross-layer fingerprinting. When used together as illustrated in Figure 4.1,
these two methods can achieve device fingerprinting from software, hardware, and physics
based perspectives and provide a strong supplement to more traditional intrusion detection
systems (IDS) in the ICS environment.
The fingerprint (or signature) of a device can be represented as a probability density
function (PDF) of the response times described above. To generate these PDFs, one of
three approaches can be used: white box, black box, and gray box modeling. In a white
box approach, a dynamic model of the device is constructed from first principles and model
parameters identified from CAD drawings, source code, physical measurements, etc. with-
out ever seeing any true samples from the system. The simulated behavior is then used to
create a PDF by varying model parameters using an uncertainty distribution. In a black
box approach, the PDF is constructed strictly from experimental data without any dynamic
modeling, requiring a significant amount of experimental measurements but little knowl-
edge of the underlying system. Finally, in a gray box approach, a dynamic model is first
constructed and the resulting PDF is then refined based on experimental measurements.
White box modeling is best suited for when a system’s internal details are accessible but
access to experimental measurements is restricted. Black box modeling performs best when
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experimental measurements are easily available and especially when the system is propri-
etary or too complex to model. Finally, gray box approaches are most advantageous when
the basic characteristics of a software or hardware design are known, but there is some un-
certainty in model structure or parameters that can only be dealt with through experimental
observations [40].
Due to the abundance of measurements in the available dataset and lack of proprietary
source code, the data acquisition fingerprinting method proposed here, called cross-layer
fingerprinting, focuses on a black box modeling approach. In the case of the physical fin-
gerprinting technique, there are some devices where the operations occur so rarely that
collecting enough real samples to generate an accurate fingerprint through black box mod-
eling is completely infeasible. To address this, previous work on physical fingerprinting
laid out the process for generating white box model fingerprints for the physical devices,
giving administrators usable fingerprints without the need for real samples. In this exten-
sion of the physical fingerprinting, only black box models are used to prove the feasibility
on other types of physical devices.
The major contributions of this chapter include:
• Novel device fingerprinting approaches that take advantage of the unique character-
istics of ICS devices
• Extended physical device fingerprinting with improved accuracy and scalability
• Performance analysis using both real world data from a power substation and con-
trolled lab tests
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. First, the assumptions and threat
model addressed by this work are presented in Section 4.2. Section 4.3 focuses on the phys-
ical fingerprinting techniques, including a review of the theory and previous results, as well
as the proposed extensions. Next, the cross-layer response time methods for fingerprinting
embedded devices is discussed in Section 4.4. Finally, the performance and limitations of
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the techniques are discussed in Section 4.5, and the results and next steps in the work are
summarized in Section 4.6.
4.2 Threat Model, Assumptions, and Goals
One of the unique challenges for ICS network security is the vast attack surface available
due to the distributed nature of many ICS networks. For example, the electric utility from
which experimental data was gathered for this research covers an area of 2800 square
miles with 35 substations, where each substation serves as a point of entry to the network.
With such a large area to cover, physical security is extremely difficult to achieve [41].
Therefore, we consider two different attacker models: 1) an outsider who is unable to gain
physical access but has compromised a low powered node in the network with malware,
and 2) an outsider who is feasibly able to gain physical access to the target network and use
her own portable machine with standard laptop computing power. The first attacker model
was chosen due to how vulnerable these devices are (as evidenced by the 30 year old TCP
vulnerabilities found widespread in the power grid [13]) and because it was the method
used on the most well known ICS attack to date, Stuxnet [42]. The second attacker model
is realistic in the scenario of a widely distributed control system where physical security is
difficult to achieve.
The adversary’s goal in this chapter is to inject false data responses, false command
responses, or both. As already discussed in the in Chapters 1 and 2, false data and command
injections such as these can have disastrous effects on the power grid. With this in mind,
the goal of this research is to develop accurate fingerprinting methods to identify what type
of device these responses are originating from as opposed to unique devices. Such methods
could be crucial to distinguishing between responses originating from a legitimate IED, an
adversary with a laptop who has gained access to the network, or a comprised IED posing
as a different device on the network.
For a formal definition, assume the global set of all ICS devices G consists of products
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Dj,k, where j identifies the vendor and k signifies the model for each vendor’s product.
Given a sequence of observations Oi every device i on the network, the goal of the fin-
gerprinting methods will be to identify which subset of G, specifically which Dj,k, those
observations belong to.
4.3 Physical Fingerprinting
Two of the properties that differentiate ICS networks from more traditional networks are
their primary functions of data acquisition through regular polling for measurements and
control commands. These properties hold true for all of the most critical ICS networks re-
gardless of the underlying physical process, including the distribution of power, water, oil,
and natural gas. The methods proposed below take advantage of these unique properties
and are explained first using the power grid as a specific example. The first proposed fin-
gerprinting approach addresses the control half of SCADA systems by extending previous
techniques for fingerprinting physical devices based on their unique physical properties
[4] [43]. Based on the differences in methods used to collect and generate the physical
fingerprints, we label the previous work as Event-driven Physical Fingerprinting and the
proposed work as Behavior-driven Physical Fingerprinting.
4.3.1 Review: Event-driven Physical Fingerprinting
In order to understand the proposed Behavior-driven Physical Fingerprinting (BPF), it is
first important to provide a detailed explanation of the previous Event-driven Physical Fin-
gerprinting(EPF) and compare them.
Review: EPF Theory
The foundational theory for both EPF and BPF are the same: differences in the mechanical
design of physical devices dictate how fast the device operates. However, there are impor-
tant differences in the assumptions made to apply this theory. In the previous EPF research
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on physical fingerprinting, operations are simply assumed to be binary. In other words,
operation time samples were single time measurements taken for the whole operation, ig-
noring the behavior of the transition between operational states and instead focusing on
the final event. Unfortunately, there are several disadvantages to making this simplifying
assumption. First, the concept of an operation being “complete” is very clear in the context
of latching relays discussed in the previous work, but it becomes much more ambiguous for
non-binary operations. If a command is sent to accelerate a centrifuge to a certain speed,
some of the ambiguities that arise include questions about how close to the target speed is
close enough and whether or not the operation is “complete” while the speed is still settling
to a steady state. In the new BPF research here, we address these questions by generat-
ing physical fingerprints from the behavior of the transition between states, offering much
richer information for classification and allowing for more general applications.
The previous EPF work also described a physical fingerprint as an estimate of the PDF
of the operation times. Formally, we defined a physical fingerprint according to Equation
4.1 [43], where M is a set of operation time measurements from a specific device, B
defines the number of bins in the histogram (and equivalently the number of features in the
signature vector), and H signifies the heuristic threshold chosen to be an estimate of the
maximum value an operation should ever take. The range of possible values is divided by
thresholds ti where ti = i HB−1 , and each element of the signature vector is given by sj .
sj =

|{m : tj−1 ≤ m < tj,m ∈M}| 0 < j < B
|{m : m > H,m ∈M}| j = B
(4.1)
In the new BPF fingerprinting proposed here, we consider more general types of finger-
print signatures to be able to capture information about the transition.
To illustrate the main theory behind both EPF and BPF, we review the simple case of
a latching relay that was the focus of previous research. Relays are commonly used in
ICS networks for controlling and switching higher power circuits with low power control
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Figure 4.2: Diagram of two different latching relays [4]
signals, and operate by using an electromagnet to move a contact that either makes or breaks
an electrical circuit. The relays used in previous research as well as this new research are
illustrated in Figure 4.2. From the figure, it is clear that there are several opportunities for
differences in design to lead to different operating characteristics, including the length of
the contact arm, the distance the arm travels, the choice of spring vs permanent magnet, and
the strength of the electromagnet. Going even deeper, the magnetic force produced while
energizing the electromagnetic core in a latching relay is directly proportional to current
though the windings (affected by the resistance of the windings), number of windings, the
cross sectional area of the core, and the material chosen for the core. Since this magnetic
force is the primary factor that determines how fast the relays operate, any variation in one
of the variables will contribute to differences in operation times.
Review: Measurement Method
To measure the operation time, previous research used the setup illustrated in Figure 4.3,
where the intelligent electronic device (IED) provided sequence of event recording (SER)
that timestamped when changes were detected at the inputs. The operation time to was
then measured by the equation top = t2 − t1 where t2 was the timestamp from the IED
and t1 was the time that the network tap observed the command being sent. Note that this
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setup requires the network tap and IED to keep tightly synchronized clocks for accurate
measurements, noise is introduced by random network and processing delays, and the SER
timestamps only have millisecond precision. These assumptions significantly limit the ac-
curacy and usefulness of the fingerprinting techniques and are addressed in the extensions
proposed here. In short, the BPF methods remove any effects from the network by measur-
ing operation times locally on the end devices themselves. This setup is explained in more
detail in Section 4.3.2.
Figure 4.3: Timing diagram to calculate Operation times [4]
Review: Results
Using the EPF methods, the previous work found distributions of close operation times for
relays from two different vendors to have noticeable differences, illustrated in Figure 4.4.
The operation times ranged from 16ms to 38ms for Vendor 1 and 14ms to 33ms for Vendor
2, resulting in useful information for classifying between the two device types. Due to the
inaccuracies in measurement, distributions for “open” operation times were found to be too
similar to be differentiable.
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Figure 4.4: Distribution of Close Operation times based on SER Responses [4]
To test classification performance, previous research applied a naı̈ve Bayes classifier
with varying levels of sample requirements. At the lower end, attempting to classify a
device after only observing one operation sample resulted in an accuracy of around 76%.
At the upper end, when the classifier was allowed to wait for 32 samples before attempting
classification, accuracies of around 92% were reached. Note that this illustrates another
important limitation of the previous EPF methods: acceptable classification performance
was only achieved with relatively large numbers of operation samples. Given that the
frequency of operation for breakers in the power grid is on the order of days or weeks,
waiting for 32 samples of breaker operations would take an infeasible amount of time.
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Review: Synthetic Fingerprint Generation
While the results obtained in the previous research for physical fingerprinting were promis-
ing, the fingerprints were generated using black box methods that assume some access to
the target devices. Alternatively, physical fingerprinting techniques may leverage a white
box, black box, or gray box modeling approach since the mechanical composition of a de-
vice can usually be obtained from manual inspection, available drawings/pictures, or manu-
facturer’s specifications. The ability to construct white box model fingerprints for physical
fingerprinting is crucial due to the rare operation of some devices, and the prohibitive cost
of performing black box modeling on all of the available devices on the market. To illus-
trate this technique, previous research described construction of the same fingerprint for the
latch relay mechanism discussed in Section 4.3.1 using white box modeling only and then
validated it against the black box model results obtained for the device in Section 4.3.1.
To test how well this white box modeled “synthetic signature” could be used in finger-
printing, the same machine learning techniques were applied as before, but trained from
the simulated distribution for one device and experimental measurements from the other
device. An artificial neural network was trained using the same number of samples for
each device, and then performance was tested using an equal number experimental mea-
surements for each device. With classification accuracy leveling off around 80%, the white
box model expectedly did not perform quite as well as the black box method based on true
measurements due to the various simplifications and estimations made during the modeling
process. However, the results were still very promising for this new class of fingerprinting.
Furthermore, in a real world scenario the white box model approach would be limited to
scenarios where there is not enough experimental data or the integrity of the experimental
data is in question. The white box approach can then be combined with the black box ap-
proach to enable gray box modeling where appropriate to achieve higher accuracy. While
there are a variety of techniques to approach this problem, Bayesian learning being one,
intuitively it is similar to simply replacing synthetic samples in the white box distribution
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with real samples over time as they become available.
The BPF methods proposed here do not go through the whole white box modeling
process as the previous research did, but for every new device type studied, we offer brief
discussion on how it could be accomplished. Note that since the BPF method uses more
detailed information about the behavior of an operation compared to the EPF methods, the
corresponding white box models also require more detailed information.
4.3.2 Behavior-driven Physical Fingerprinting
The previous work on EPF methods only focused on relays and breakers, which while im-
portant, only represent a small and simple subset of the variety of actuators in ICS settings.
Furthermore, the techniques presented required very specific conditions where devices’
clocks had to stay perfectly synchronized for accurate operation times to be measured. In
this section described the Behavior-driven Physical Fingerprinting (BPF) we address both
of these limitations by porting the techniques to PLCs, which allows for a more general
variety of actuators and more stable timing measurements regardless of the network archi-
tecture.
BFP Methods
The experimental setup for the previous work on physical fingerprinting, illustrated in Fig-
ure 4.3, measured operation times by taking the difference between the system time that the
sniffer observed a command packet traverse the network and the event timestamp recorded
in the slave device’s response. The sniffer’s system clock must stay tightly synchronized
with the end device that is recording event timestamps or else the clocks will drift and the
measurements will become useless. Additionally, with this measurement setup the further
away the network tap is from the slave device, the more “signal noise” is introduced by
network and switching delays. Therefore, accurate measurements using the previous meth-
ods required networks taps being placed as close as possible to the devices operating the
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actuators, which would inhibit the feasibility of a widespread real-world deployment.
Figure 4.5: BFP Method of Measuring Operation Times
The BPF method improves on the previous EPF method of measuring operation times
by using PLCs instead of smart relays, and by adding a minimal amount of extra lines of
programming in the PLCs to enable the PLCs themselves to measure the operation time
of the actuators they are connected to. The master device in the control system can then
poll the PLCs for the operation time as it would for any other measurement of the under-
lying process. This new experimental setup, illustrated in Figure 4.5, removes any chance
of clock drift or network delays affecting the operation time measurements, making the
technique much more feasible for widespread deployment. Furthermore, the increased pre-
cision in operation time measurements and the richer source of information provided by
examining the transitional behavior of the operations both significantly improve classifica-
tion accuracy for similarly rated devices.
To compare the EPF and BPF methods, we now discuss the theory, measurement meth-
ods, and classification results for a variety of devices including latching relays, valves, AC
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induction motors, and diaphragm pumps.
Relays
Theory. To illustrate the BPF method, it was first applied to the exact same physical
relays from the previous work in Section 4.3.1. The same basic theory from Section 4.3.1
about the latching relays still applies here. Differences in design choices about the various
components of the electromagnet, the moving contact arms, and the holding mechanism
(spring vs magnet, e.g.) all work together to determine the operation speed.
Method. To measure the relay operation times, a PLC was programmed to measure the
time between when it energizes an output to operate a relay, and when its inputs detect that
the relay circuit has been closed. Given the extremely fast operation time and the nature of
electromechanical relays, it is infeasible to measure transitional behavior for relays. There-
fore, the fingerprint signatures for the new BPF methods simplify down into essentially the
same signatures as the EPF method, but using the more precise operation measurements
taken by the PLC.
Results. Recall from Figure 4.4 that the distributions of close operation times had sig-
nificant overlap, requiring multiple samples to be taken before an accurate classification
could be made, and still only having accuracy levels around 92%. With the more precise
measurement supplied by the BPF method, there is now zero overlap in the distributions in
Figure 4.6. This means that given a single relay operation time sample, the new BPF meth-
ods can immediately classify the relays with perfect 100% accuracy, making a dramatic
improvement over the EPF results.
Valves
Theory. Now we consider applying the BPF technique to valves, which represent another
large class of ICS actuators. Valves control the flow of liquids and gases in applications
ranging from water treatment, oil & gas, chemical manufacturing, and steam power plants.
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Figure 4.6: Relay Close Operation Times with More Accurate Measurements
They are typically designed to either operate in discrete states (e.g., only fully open or
closed) or a continuous range holding a certain position between open and closed to enable
precise control of the fluid flow rate and pressure. To make the most direct comparison to
the previous work on relays, we first consider discrete valves designed to change between
states of being completely open and completely closed. The specific type of valves used
here were 90◦ ball valves with electric motor actuators. As can be seen from the generic
diagram in Figure 4.7, these kinds of valves operate by rotating a ball with a cylindrical
hole drilled through it. In the “open” state, the hole is directly lined up with the input and
output ports, theoretically providing no obstruction to flow. In the “closed” state, the ball
is turned so that no part of the hole is exposed to the input and output ports, completely
blocking any flow. In “modulating” style valves, the ball can be turned to any position in
between these two states to precisely control flow and pressure. The specific models of
valves used in this research are illustrated in Figure 4.8.
According to the documentation, both valves have the same “cycle times” (i.e., oper-
ation times) of four seconds. In the simplest form, this cycle time t is a function of the
speed of the motor v (in rotations per minute), and the radial distance r it has to rotate the
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Figure 4.7: Diagram of manual ball valve [44]
ball valve (one quarter rotation), or simply t = r/v. Ideally, these valves rotate exactly
the same distance using motors that rotate at the exact same speed. However, minor differ-
ences in the manufacturing processes for all of the internal physical components contribute
to real-world differences. In reality, the radial distance that each valve motor rotates is not
exactly 90◦, but instead is determined by the calibration of the limit switches indicating the
closed and open positions. Variations in the internal resistance of the actuator motors affect
the exact torque and speed that the motors are capable of and tiny differences in the ball,
stem, gears, lubrication, gaskets and seals can all contribute to different forces of friction
encountered when turning the valve.
Method. To measure valve operation time, PLCs were programmed to measure the time
between the output was physically energized, to when the valve limit switches indicated the
closed or open position. The valves used in this set of experiments were the two electrically
actuated ball valves shown in Figures 4.8. Note that the only difference in specification
from the vendor comes from the design of the body being two pieces, or three pieces for
easier disassembly and cleaning. Otherwise, the two valves should contain the exact same
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(a) Valve with 2-piece body
(Valve 1)
(b) Valve with 3-piece body
(Valve 2)
Figure 4.8: Ball Valves
Figure 4.9: Valve Operation Time Distributions
parts including the 110VAC motor actuator and 1/2 inch ball valve.
Results. Due to all of the variations in the actual component specifications, the distri-
bution of open and close times for the two valves in Figure 4.9 are easily different. In fact,
there is absolutely no overlap between close operation times, meaning a simple threshold
check around 3790ms would classify the two valves with perfect accuracy, with no need
for any machine learning. Again, it is important to note that this perfect classification ac-
curacy is achieved after a single operation sample, compared to the EPF methods for relays
attaining 92% accuracy with 32 samples.
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Although beyond the scope of this work, white box models could also be created for
valves by expanding on the earlier, oversimplified equation of t = r/v. For example,
precise measurements could be made to determine the exact rotational distance between
the limit switches being “open” and “closed” to fill in for r. Then, the speed v of the valve
motor could either be directly measured or estimated from parameters such as internal
motor resistance, gear ratios, back EMF (if DC), and AC frequency (if AC motor).
Motors
Theory. The relays, breakers, and valves discussed up to this point all have very clear
operational states: open and closed. However, other actuators require more complex de-
scriptions for their states. For example, consider a motor controlling a centrifuge. The
motor is not simply on or off, but instead must accelerate to the desired rotational speed,
and depending on the tuning of the control loop may hover around the given setpoint. A
physical fingerprint for this type of operation must take into account the starting speed, the
target speed, and the characteristics of the acceleration to the target speed.
For this set of experiments, 3-phase AC induction motors were chosen to illustrate
how to apply Behavior-driven Physical Fingerprinting (BPF) to motors, since they are used
in a wide variety of applications including conveyor belts, fans, and centrifugal pumps.
These induction motors work by using 3-phase power to create a rotating magnetic field,
illustrated in Figure 4.10, that provides the torque to turn the rotor. The synchronous speed
n for a given induction motor, which measures how fast the magnetic field is rotating,
can be calculated using the formula, n = 120f/p, where f is the input frequency and p
is the number of magnetic poles in the induction motor [45]. For example, the motors
used in this research had 6 poles and were rated for 60Hz input frequency, so they all had
a synchronous speed of 1200RPM. To control the actual speed of an induction motor, the
input frequency in the previous equation must be changed from 60Hz using another piece of
industrial equipment called a variable frequency drive (VFD). VFDs work by taking in fixed
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(a) 3-phase waveform and rotating mag-
netic field
(b) Poles of a 3-phase induction motor
Figure 4.10: 3 Phase Induction Motor Diagrams
frequency (e.g., 60Hz) power and using pulse width modulation to output power at varying
frequencies (Figure 4.11a) with higher frequencies causing a faster rotating magnetic field
and faster motor speed.
It is important to note, however, that in order to produce the torque necessary to drive
any loads, the speed at which an induction motor shaft actually rotates must be less than
its synchronous frequency. Therefore, the nameplate RPM rating for induction motors are
always given as slightly less than their synchronous speeds, and this difference is called
the motor “slip”. This slip is directly proportional to rotor resistance and load, so any
differences in these variables result in different rotation speeds [46].
Method. To investigate physical fingerprints for motors, three 3-phase AC induction
motors were chosen with the same horsepower rating, same synchronous speed, and similar
nameplate RPM ratings, illustrated in Figure 4.12. Each motor was then in turn directly
controlled by the same VFD in Figure 4.11b, which was monitored and controlled by a
PLC. The VFD was calibrated to each motor separately, and the PLC was then programmed
to command the VFD to alternate between low and high speeds. The PLC monitored the
reported output frequency from the VFD and measured how long it took for the frequency
to reach every fifth percentile between the low and high speeds, resulting in 20 samples
71
(a) VFD converts fixed fre-
quency input power to vari-
able frequency output
(b) Schneider Altivar 12 VFD
Figure 4.11: Variable frequency drives (VFDs)
(a) Motor 1: 1140RPM,
1/4HP
(b) Motor 2: 1140RPM,
1/4HP
(c) Motor 3: 1160RPM,
1/4HP
Figure 4.12: AC motors
along the acceleration ramp.
Results. Due to the extremely similar ratings of the motors and the high quality of the
VFD control, the average acceleration ramps in Figure 4.13 look very similar to the naked
eye. However, even though the differences are small they are consistent, which means
that application of basic machine learning or statistical classification techniques is likely to
perform well. To further support the argument made earlier that no sophisticated machine
learning techniques are necessary, we simply use the Mahalanobis distance metric to per-
form the classification. Proposed in 1936, the Mahalanobis distance essentially measures
the number of standard deviations away a sample point is from a known distribution in n di-
mensional space. Formally, the equation is given by DM =
√
(x− µ)Σ−1(x− µ)T , where
x is the sample point, µ is the mean of the test distribution, and Σ is the inverse of the co-
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Figure 4.13: Average motor acceleration ramps
variance matrix of the test distribution [47]. In this specific case, each motor’s distribution
was defined by the 20 dimensional mean of the acceleration ramp and the corresponding
covariance matrix.
A total of 100 sample runs for each motor was taken, with half randomly being used
for “training” (calculating the mean and covariance matrix), and half being used for test
data. For every test sample point, the Mahalanobis distance was first used to determine
which motor distribution was closest, and then to determine whether the sample was close
enough to that distribution to be positively classified, or to be labeled as “unknown”. This
confidence threshold for “unknown” classifications was then varied to create an ROC curve
in Figure 4.14. Note that after the threshold is large enough, the false positive rate stops
increasing and the classification algorithm always picks the motor that is closest and never
decides it is unknown, resulting in a maximum true positive rate of about 88% at a false
positive rate of 5%. While this performance is acceptable, real world scenarios would
provide even more opportunity for higher accuracies where motors are driving different
loads.
White box models for motors could theoretically be generated simply from the name-
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Figure 4.14: ROC Curve for 3-Phase AC induction motors
plate RPM rating and estimate of the load torque, or more detailed measurements of the
rotor resistance and motor slip.
Pumps
Theory. Pumps represent another class of physical devices used in almost every industry.
They transport oil & gas, distribute drinking water for a city, and move the water used
in steam power plants. One of the many uses for the type of motors examined in the
previous section is in centrifugal pumps, which use a rotating impeller to increase velocity
and pressure of the input flow of fluid, illustrated in Figure 4.15a. To generate physical
fingerprints for centrifugal pumps, the previous methods can simply be used to fingerprint
the motors driving the pump. However, other types of pumps are used in industry as well,
so more general methods of fingerprinting are required.
To examine general methods for fingerprinting pumps, two diaphragm pumps (Figure
4.16) were chosen with similar ratings. As opposed to centrifugal pumps which translate
rotational energy into movement of fluids, diaphragm pumps use alternating linear motion




Figure 4.15: Example pump diagrams
(a) Pump 1: 12VDC power supply,
rated for 3.3 gallons per minute and 35
PSI pressure cutoff
(b) Pump 2: 12VDC power supply,
rated for 5.5 gallons per minute and 60
PSI pressure cutoff
Figure 4.16: Small industrial diaphragm pumps
ing an electrical engineering analogy, pumps can be thought of as constant voltage sources,
providing a constant pressure differential necessary to move fluid (current) through a pipe
(circuit). Depending on the exact speed at which the diaphragm alternates and the vol-
ume of fluid displaced by the diaphragm on each cycle, each pump will produce different
pressures up to their maximum cutoff limits.
Methods. Since the primary purpose of pumps is to increase flow and pressure of
fluids in a system, these were the physical measurements used to fingerprint the pumps.
The industrial transmitters used to measure the flow and pressure for these experiments are
shown in Figure 4.17, with 2% and 0.5% accuracies respectively.
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(a) Flow meter, 2% accuracy with a
15GPM range
(b) Differential pressure sensor, 0.5%
accuracy over a 50PSI range
Figure 4.17: Industrial flow meter and pressure sensor
The physical setup for the pumps consisted of the diaphragm pumps lifting water about
3 feet from a reservoir, going through a flow meter, lifting the water another 1 foot to a
pressure sensor, and then circulating the water back down to the reservoir. Since this dis-
sertation is for the School of Electrical and Computer Engineering and not mechanical or
chemical engineering, it is helpful to make analogies to circuit diagrams we are more fa-
miliar with. In this analogy, the typical comparisons are as follows: voltage is equivalent
to water pressure, current is the same as flow rate, voltage sources and batteries can be
thought of as pumps and elevated containers of water, and resistors can be thought of as
constrictions in the piping. With these analogies, the equivalent circuit diagram is repre-
sented in Figure 4.18. Note that the “battery” in the circuit represents the vertical section
of tubing leading from the horizontal section where the pressure sensor is, back down to
the reservoir at standard atmospheric pressure. This means that while the vertical section
of the tubing is empty, the pressure sensor is measuring the difference between the initial
pressure that the pumps are supplying and the pressure caused by gravity on the left side.
After water begins flowing through the entire circuit, gravity on the right side will begin to
contribute pressure, resulting in a sudden drop in pressure at the pressure sensor.
To measure the pressure and flow behavior for each pump, a PLC was programmed to
conduct 200 cycles of turning on the pumps, sampling the pressure and flow every 10ms
for 500ms total, then turning off the pumps letting the system drain.
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Figure 4.18: Pump “circuit”
Results. The resulting flow and pressure ramps were then averaged to create Figures
4.19 and 4.20. Note that the flow rates created by the pumps increase at obviously different
rates, again suggesting any standard classification algorithm would perform well. The same
Mahalanobis distance classifier as in the previous section was applied, and the confidence
threshold was varied resulting in true positive rates of 94% and zero false positives.
Looking at the pressure behavior in Figure 4.20 again shows obvious differences be-
tween the pumps. In fact, the pressure behavior is so different, that using the Mahalanobis
distance classifier results in perfect classification accuracy with zero false positives. ROC
curves were omitted for these experiments as they are simply vertical lines at zero false
positive rate ending at their maximum true positive rate.
White box modeling using the flow rate could be achieved by using the rated specifica-
tions of flow rate, or by measuring the speed at which the diaphragm of a pump alternates
and estimating the volume of water each cycle displaces in order to predict the maximum
flow rate. To estimate the ramps seen in Figure 4.19, one would also have to estimate the
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Figure 4.19: Pump flows
Figure 4.20: Pump pressures
78
effect of the paddlewheel flow meter accelerating up to the actual flow rate.
4.4 Cross-layer Response Times
The second cyber-physical fingerprinting method is evaluated using data from a live power
substation and verified with controlled lab experiments. This method addresses the data
acquisition half of SCADA systems by leveraging the interaction between regular polling
of measurement data at the application layer with acknowledgments at the TCP layer to get
an estimate of the time a device takes to process the request, and then develops a fingerprint
for each device based on the distribution of these times. The timing diagram of how this
measurement, which we call the cross-layer response time (CLRT), would be taken in a
typical SCADA network is illustrated in Figure 4.21. It should be noted that since the
CLRT measurement is based on the time between two consecutive packets from the same
source to the same destination, it is independent of the round trip time between the two
nodes.
Figure 4.21: Measurement of cross-layer response time
The fingerprint signature is defined by a vector of bin counts from a histogram of CLRTs
where the final bin includes all values greater than a heuristic threshold. For a formal defi-
nition, let M be a set of CLRT measurements from a specific device, B define the number
of bins in the histogram (and equivalently the number of features in the signature vector),
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and H signify the heuristic threshold chosen to be an estimate of the global maximum that
CLRT measurements should ever take. We divide the range of possible values by thresh-




|{m : tj−1 ≤ m < tj,m ∈M}| 0 < j < B
|{m : m > H,m ∈M}| j = B
(4.2)
4.4.1 Theory
The CLRT measurement is advantageous for fingerprinting ICS devices because it remains
relatively static and its distribution is unique within device types and even software con-
figurations. To understand why this is true for ICS devices, all of the factors which might
affect this measurement must be considered.
Device Characteristics. ICS devices have simpler hardware and software architectures
than general purpose computers because they are built to perform very specialized critical
tasks and do little else. A typical modern-day computer now has fast multi-core processors
in the range of 2-3GHz with significant caching, gigabytes of RAM, and context switch-
ing between the wide variety of processes running on the machine. In contrast, the ICS
world is dominated by programmable logic controllers (PLCs) running on low powered
CPUs in the tens to hundreds of MHz frequencies with little to no caching, tens to hun-
dreds of megabytes of RAM and very few processes. With such limited computing power
available, relatively small changes in programming result in observable timing differences.
Depending on the desired task, different ICS device types are built with different hardware
specifications (CPU frequencies, memory and bus speeds) [18] as well as different soft-
ware (operating systems, protocol stack implementations, number of measurements being
taken, complexity of control logic) all resulting in each one being able to process requests
at different speeds. However most importantly, no matter what kind of ICS network it is in
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or what physical value the device is measuring (e.g. voltage, pressure, flow rate, temper-
ature) the device is still going to go through the same process of parsing the data request,
retrieving the measurement from memory, and sending the response. Therefore, due to
the limited processing power and fixed CPU load CLRTs can be leveraged to identify ICS
device types, but this does not explain why the CLRTs are so constant over the network.
Network Level Characteristics. Although the use case for this technique (as in the
deployment of any anomaly based IDS) would involve a training period on each target net-
work, one of the desired properties for device fingerprinting in general is that the network
architecture of the target not be a significant factor.
In a traditional corporate network mobile phones and laptops are constantly moving
around and connecting to different wireless access points. The traffic they are generating
is traveling over vast distances, encountering routers that are experiencing unpredictable
loads, and consecutive packets are never guaranteed to take the same path over the Internet.
However, devices in ICS networks are dedicated to one critical task and are fixed in a
permanent location. The traffic generated from their regular polling intervals travel over
relatively short geographic distance and over simple network architectures that offer little to
no chance for consecutive packets to take different paths. The regular polling cycle means
that routers and switches on ICS networks have consistent predictable loads which result in
consistent and predictable queuing delays. Consequently for any given ICS network, a TCP
ACK and SCADA response sent in quick succession will with extremely high probability
take the same exact path, encounter the same delay, and therefore have a very consistent
spacing in between them. Therefore, there is little opportunity for differences in network
architecture to cause significant changes in the distribution of CLRTs. In Section 4.4.3
we study how much a change in networks effects the performance by learning fingerprints
from one substation and testing the fingerprints over a year later on a different substation.
Due to the low computational power found in ICS devices, the CLRTs are much larger
than most delays that might be caused by differences in network architecture. In the real-
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world dataset used for this research, illustrated in Figure 4.24a, the CLRTs are all on the
order of tens or even hundreds of milliseconds. In contrast, typical latencies obtained
from ICS network switch datasheets and theoretical transmission delays on a 100Mbps
link are both on the order of microseconds, resulting in a minor contribution to the overall
CLRT measurement. Furthermore, ICS networks most often have over-provisioned avail-
able bandwidth to ensure reliability (e.g. the live power substation network studied for this
research used an average of 11Kbps bandwidth out of the available 100Mbps, a strikingly
low traffic intensity of 0.01%). These low traffic intensities ensure that the switches and
routers on the network are never heavily loaded and have consistently low queuing delays.
Finally, even in the scenario where two network architectures are so different as to
significantly alter the distribution of CLRTs, this would have no significant effect on the
defensive utility of the proposed method and would arguably make it stronger. Any real-
world application of the fingerprinting technique would involve a training period on the
target network that would capture the minor effects of the network architecture. Then, if an
attacker was attempting to create an offline database of signatures for all device types and
software configurations without access to the specific target network, she would also have
to consider all the possible network architectures that could affect them.
Due to this combination of low computational power, fixed CPU loads, and simple
networks with predictable traffic, any significant change in a device’s distribution of CLRTs
highly suggests either an attacker spoofing the responses with a different machine, or a
change in CPU workload [48] or software configuration, which could be a sign of a device
being compromised with malware.
4.4.2 Experimental Setup
To test this method, experiments were run at a large scale using a real world dataset as well
as on a small scale using controlled lab tests. The large scale tests were conducted in two
rounds, before and after changes in the network architecture. First, network traffic ( 20GB)
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Figure 4.22: Network Architecture of First Substation
was captured from a live power substation with roughly 130 devices running the DNP3
protocol over the span of five months with the network architecture as illustrated in Figure
4.22. Then over a year later, one more month of data was captured from the same substa-
tion after the network was slightly modified by replacing the main router with a new switch,
changing the IP addressing scheme accordingly, and increasing the frequency of measure-
ment polling. Additionally, a brief overnight capture was collected from another substation
with a different architecture (roughly 80 devices using DNP3, illustrated in Figure 4.23) to
test if fingerprints learned on one network would translate to another. The company oper-
ating the substations provided a list of all device IP addresses on the network organized by
location, device type, and device software configuration, and machine learning techniques
were applied to attempt to make these labeled classifications.
Further tests were conducted in the lab to study the effects of the software configuration
alone and to rule out any possible factors related to different hardware or different round-
trip times (RTT) on the network.
In both scenarios, CLRT measurements were taken from DNP3 polling requests for
event data and were summarized by dividing all measurements into time slices (e.g. one
hour, or one day) and calculating means, variances, and 200-bin histograms for each time
slice. Machine learning techniques were then evaluated using two different feature vectors:
a more complex approach using the arrays of bin counts as defined in Equation 4.2 and a
simple approach using arrays containing only the mean and variance for each time slice.
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Figure 4.23: Network Architecture of Second Substation
4.4.3 Results
Device and Software Type Fingerprinting. To obtain a rough visualization of the sep-
arability of the device types based on their CLRT measurements, a scatter plot based on
the mean and variances of CLRTs was produced and the true labels of the devices were
illustrated in Figure 4.24a. Each point represents the mean and variance of the CLRT mea-
surements for one IP address over the course of one day out of the original five month
dataset. From the figure we can tell that even using simple metrics such as means and
variances, results in the vendors and hardware device types being highly separable. Fur-
thermore, it suggests that this method can also subdivide identical hardware device types
into classes based on different software configurations (Vendor A Types 1a and 1b). For
verification of this hypothesis, see Appendix 4.4.4. These conclusions were further sup-
ported when the probability density functions (PDFs) of CLRTs over a day were estimated
for each type in Figure 4.24b.
Since Figure 4.24a illustrates that device types are clearly separable based on simple
mean and variance measurements, virtually any choice of a properly tuned machine learn-
ing algorithm would result in high accuracy classification. Therefore, as the purpose and
novelty of this work is not the use of machine learning for fingerprinting, a sampling of the
most popular algorithms in the field were chosen as examples.
To measure the performance of our fingerprinting techniques throughout this work, we
calculate the standard classification metrics of accuracy, precision, and recall as defined in
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(a) CLRT samples for all devices with a time slice of one
day
(b) Estimated PDFs of CLRTs for five sample devices over
one day
Figure 4.24: Separability of device types based on CLRT
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Equations 4.3, 4.4, and 4.5 for each class separately, where TP , TN , FP , and FN stand
for true positive, true negative, false positive, and false negative, respectively. To sum-














The first machine learning algorithm used in these experiments to classify the labeled
data was a feed forward artificial neural network (FF-ANN) with one hidden layer trained
using the back propagation algorithm. This algorithm was chosen due to its popularity
and previous use in related work [18]. The bin counts of the histograms, as defined in
Equation 4.2, were used as the feature vector for each sample and the time slice they were
taken over was varied. The samples were randomly divided using 75% as training data and
25% as testing data. The average and minimum accuracy, precision, and recall for these
experiments are shown in Figure 4.25, and suggests that even with time slices as small as
5 minutes an average accuracy of 93% can be achieved. Some devices at this substation
were being polled only once every 2 minutes, so the 5 minute detection time is roughly
equivalent to a decision after only two samples. Furthermore, when false data is injected
into a control system catastrophic damage usually cannot immediately occur due to built-
in safety features in the system. The most successful attacks would sabotage equipment
or product over an extended period of time, for example by tricking a control system into
heating a reactor past its limits and causing it to explode.
To demonstrate that the exact choice of machine learning algorithm is largely irrelevant,
we also attempted supervised learning using one of the simplest algorithms in the literature,
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Figure 4.25: Fingerprint Classification Performance Using FF-ANN
a multinomial naı̈ve Bayes classifier. The signature vectors remained the same and similar
experiments were conducted to determine the required training period and detection time.
Furthermore, these tests were conducted to simulate a real world deployment instead of
randomly choosing training and test data, the training data was taken from the beginning
of the capture and the test data was taken from the following 1000 detection time windows.
After studying Figures 4.26a and 4.26b, it is clear that the simple Bayes classifier performs
even better than the more complex ANN and can achieve high accuracy classification with
detection times as small as a few minutes.
The above results are extremely promising for supervised learning when a list of IP
addresses and corresponding device types are available, but this is not the case for admin-
istrators trying to understand what devices are on a poorly documented legacy network. To
address this scenario, unsupervised learning techniques were also applied and tested if they
could accurately cluster the devices into their true classes. Referring back to Figure 4.24a,
it is clear that the samples closely follow a multivariate Gaussian distribution, so it was
decided to illustrate unsupervised learning with Gaussian mixture models (GMM) using a
full covariance matrix and a signature vector consisting of means and variances with a time
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(a) Accuracy, precision, and recall of supervised Bayes clas-
sifier as a function of detection time
(b) Accuracy, precision, and recall as a function of training
time
Figure 4.26: Fingerprint classification performance
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slice of one day. Figure 4.27 shows the estimated clusters learned from the GMM algo-
rithm, which upon comparison with the true clusters in Figure 4.24a, looks very similar.
When the dataset was tested against the learned clusters, the model achieved an accuracy of
92.86%, a precision of 0.891, and a recall of 0.956. With performance as nearly as high as
the supervised learning methods, this unsupervised technique would allow administrators
to develop an accurate database of fingerprints with very little knowledge of the network
itself.
Figure 4.27: Randomly generated samples from the unsupervised learned clusters
Effect of Network Architecture. While the previous experiments, simulating a real-
world deployment with a training period on the target network, performed very well, we
also wanted to study how much the network architecture affects the performance of the
fingerprinting techniques. For the first experiment to study these effects, the original sub-
station was revisited over a year later after the network architecture had been upgraded and
polling frequency had been increased. When the distribution of the new architecture in Fig-
ure 4.28a is compared with the original in Figure 4.24b, there are only minor differences.
When the fingerprints learned from the original capture were tested on the new data, very
high accuracies in Figure 4.29a were obtained suggesting that the method is stable over
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long periods of time and over minor changes in the same network.
Even though the primary defensive use-case for this technique would always involve a
training period on the target network, we also consider the rare case where an administrator
is able to learn fingerprints on one network because of known labels, but does not have
the labels for a different network. To study this scenario, we learned fingerprints from our
original capture and tested them on a different substation over a year later. When the differ-
ent substation’s distribution in Figure 4.28b is compared with the original there are some
small, but noticeable changes that could be result of the different architecture affecting the
timings or from the different electrical circuit affecting the load of the devices. When the
fingerprints learned from the original capture were tested on this different network, the av-
erage accuracy seemed to level off around 90% suggesting that while the accuracy may be
diminished across different networks, there is still some utility in the technique.
Finally, to show that the technique performs well on different networks when trained
individually, we trained a Bayes classifier on one hour of data from the second substation
and tested it on the remaining seventeen hours of data with the results in Figure 4.30.
4.4.4 Software Configuration Fingerprinting
To verify the suggestions from the large scale experiments that the software configura-
tion was observable through CLRT measurements, lab experiments were performed on the
same exact IED with different settings enabled and disabled. Approximately 700 CLRT
measurements were taken for each of three cases: all extra settings enabled, only overcur-
rent protection enabled, and all extra settings disabled. When comparing the distributions
for all extra settings enabled versus disabled in Figure 4.31, there are several noticeable
differences. In fact, when the same FF-ANN from the previous experiments was trained
on these two cases, perfect classification accuracy was achieved. Figure 4.32 shows only
minor differences between the ‘free’ case and the overcurrent case, and consequently, the
FF-ANN only achieves roughly 66% classification accuracy.
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(a) CLRT Distribution After network Changes
(b) CLRT Distribution of Second Substation
Figure 4.28: Minor effects of network architecture on CLRT distributions
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(a) Classification Performance After Network Changes
(b) Classification Performance Across Substations
Figure 4.29: Classification Performance Across Networks
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Figure 4.30: Classification Performance on Second Substation
Figure 4.31: Effect of multiple settings enabled on CLRT distribution
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In order for a fingerprinting method to be useful for any situation, whether it is for intrusion
detection, surveillance, or network management, the techniques should be accurate and
scalable.
Accuracy Effective intrusion detection techniques require high true positive rates (TPRs)
with acceptable false positive rates (FPRs). The definition of what an acceptable rate of
false positives is depends on the base rate of classification events. In the IT world, a net-
work can see on the order of a million “events” per day, so the false positive rate must be
on the order of 10−5 in order to achieve a manageable number of false positives per day.
In the ICS world, the base rate of physical events is much lower. A given local ICS net-
work may have a few hundred physical devices, with each being operated only a handful of
times per day resulting in a base rate on the order of a thousand events per day. With this
base rate, acceptable FPRs only need to be on the order of 10−2 to be manageable. While
the performance of the previous physical fingerprinting research was borderline acceptable
(92%), the new methods dramatically improve the accuracy. Perfect classification perfor-
mance was achieved for pumps, valves, and relays, and three-class AC motor classification
performed slightly worse with a TPR of 88% and FPR of 5%. Again, note however, that
these results are expected to improve in a real-world deployment where different motors
are driving different loads.
For the CLRT method, the relevant base rate to consider is the number of read requests
on the network. For the given test data, around 100 nodes were on each network, being
polled roughly once a minute, resulting in a base rate on the order of a few hundred thou-
sand events per day and a target FPR on the order of 10−4. The CLRT method achieved
classification accuracies as high as 99% in some cases, providing acceptable performance
for input into an IDS, but not ideal. False positives could be further reduced using alert
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correlation or by incorporating a confidence threshold before alerting.
Scalability The FF-ANN algorithm used in training the two fingerprinting techniques
only had one hidden layer and 200 input features, resulting in reasonable scalability for
computational complexity. The other methods including the Bayes classifier and Maha-
lanobis distance classifier are standard techniques that are computationally efficient as well.
Furthermore, our results suggest that the accuracy for the methods scales as well. The
CLRT method was already tested above on a full scale power substation network and was
able to achieve high accuracies.
4.5.2 Robustness Against Forgery
When using device fingerprinting to augment traditional IDS methods, it is also desired that
the fingerprints be non-trivial to forge (i.e., resistant to mimicry attacks). Fortunately there
are several reasons as to why the proposed methods are not so easily broken. First, there
is always going to be inherent randomness in the attacker’s machine that makes it non-
trivial to perfectly reproduce anything based on precision timing, and difficult to accurately
reproduce the CLRT fingerprint. The previous physical fingerprinting work had accuracy
limitations from using network timing and clock synchronization, but these same aspect
made it difficult for physical fingerprints to be forged.
To evaluate the proposed methods against forgery, we consider two different classes of
adversary. First, we consider the case where an adversary is unable to gain physical access
to the target network but instead is able to compromise one of the low powered devices on
an air-gapped network, as in the case of Stuxnet [42]. Her goal is to watch the network
long enough to generate black box fingerprints and spoof the responses of another device
while matching their fingerprint. To model this adversary, we use a BeagleBone Black with
512MB of RAM and its ARM processor clocked down to 300MHz to simulate the resources
available on a high-end PLC. Second, we consider a stronger adversary that has gained
physical access to the network and is able to use her own, more powerful, machine to spoof
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the responses. This stronger adversary was modeled by a standard desktop with a 3.4 GHz
quad-core i7 processor and 16GB of RAM. In both scenarios, the adversary is assumed to
have gathered accurate samples and therefore has perfect knowledge of the signature she
must try to mimic. However, in reality there are several difficulties that would make this
perfect knowledge unlikely. First, since the ICS environment contains an abundance of
legacy devices, it is not certain that the compromised device would even have a network
card that supports promiscuous mode for network sniffing. Additionally, any sniffing code
installed on a low powered, compromised device would most likely be computationally
expensive enough to skew timing measurements on the system. Furthermore, since it was
found in Figure 4.29 that network architecture does have some effect on the fingerprint,
this suggests that the adversary would have to sniff the network in the same location as the
fingerprinter to get a completely accurate distribution, or be able to determine the effects
of the network by other means.
Cross-Layer Response Time Forgery
To test the cross-layer fingerprinting method, an open source implementation of DNP3
(OpenDNP3 version 2.0.1) was modified to have microsecond precision sleep statements
using the known CLRT distribution of one of the Vendor A Type 1b devices. The forgery
attempt by the weaker adversary in Figure 4.33a shows very clear differences in the dis-
tributions due to the limited resources slowing the distribution down and adding its own
randomness. The stronger adversary’s forgery attempt can be seen in Figure 4.33b. Com-
pared with the original, the two distributions are very similar but the forged one is slightly
slower due to the adversary’s own processing time.
When the Bayes classifier was applied to distinguish between the real device’s distribu-
tion and the attacker’s forged distribution, the results in Figure 4.35 suggest high accuracy
detection of the forgery can be achieved.
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(a) Forgery Attempt for CLRT Fingerprinting Under Weak
Adversary
(b) Forgery Attempt for CLRT Fingerprinting Under Strong
Adversary
Figure 4.33: Forgery attempts against the CLRT technique
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EPF Forgery
To study the forgery of the EPF physical fingerprinting technique, a DNP3 master was
configured to send operate commands every second, and the adversary machine’s modi-
fied OpenDNP3 code was programmed to send responses with timestamps calculated from
the machine’s current time, added with the known distribution of operation times. The
resulting forgery attempt by the weaker adversary can be seen in Figure 4.34a. The distri-
butions appear completely different due to the BeagleBone’s clock quickly drifting from
the SCADA master’s, thus making the forgery attempt easily detected. The forgery attempt
by the stronger adversary, illustrated in Figure 4.34b, is similar to the original, but still
has noticeable differences most likely due to the high-end PC timestamping the operations
faster than the original device.
The results from the Bayes classifier in this scenario in Figure 4.35 also suggest high
accuracy detection of forgery is possible.
Even though both the CLRT and EPF fingerprinting techniques exhibit resistance to
these naı̈ve forgery attacks, it is still theoretically possible that an attacker could more
intelligently shape her response times to more closely match the true fingerprint and im-
plement a method of keeping better clock synchronization with the target. However, this
would require a significantly more knowledgeable and skilled adversary to successfully
accomplish. She would have to know beforehand the relative speed of her machine to the
target’s machine, have knowledge of any effects the network architecture might have on the
signature, and determine how fast the target’s clock drifts, all suggesting that these methods
are robust enough to be used as part of a defense-in-breadth IDS strategy.
BPF Forgery
Unfortunately, with the movement of the operation time measurement from the network to
the local PLC, there is a tradeoff with robustness. As a reminder, in the extended physical
fingerprinting techniques, the PLC itself is measuring the operation time and reporting it
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(a) Forgery Attempt for Physical Fingerprinting Under
Weak Adversary
(b) Forgery Attempt for Physical Fingerprinting Under
Strong Adversary
Figure 4.34: Forgery attempts against the physical fingerprinting technique
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(a) Forgery Detection for Weak Adversary
(b) Forgery Detection for Strong Adversary
Figure 4.35: Forgery Detection
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back over the network using standard ICS network protocols, which are notorious for not
providing any encryption or integrity mechanisms. This means that any adversary who
can sniff the network can then have full knowledge of the distribution and replay a perfect
forgery over the network. Even though there are several practical obstacles to an adversary
gaining the necessary access to a device capable of sniffing the network, this provides no
security guarantees and only increases the difficulty of successfully injecting the false data.
4.5.3 Limitations
While both proposed fingerprinting methods perform well under certain conditions, there
are some limitations. The cross-layer fingerprinting method first requires a SCADA proto-
col using “Read” and “Response” messages, which all of the most popular SCADA proto-
cols implement. Furthermore, the SCADA protocol must sit on top of a TCP implementa-
tion that uses at least a minimum amount of “quick ACKs” (immediately ACKing a packet
instead of delaying in the hopes of piggybacking). For example, modern Linux systems use
quick ACKs to accelerate TCP slow start at the beginning of connections and after retrans-
missions, but every vendor in the observed power substation dataset used quick ACKs for
every packet, presumably to reduce latency. Therefore, the amount of quick ACKs used by
a device would determine how quickly a fingerprint could be generated.
The new BPF physical fingerprinting techniques vastly improve on the accuracy and
scalability of the previous EPF methods, however at a cost in robustness.
The highest classification accuracies achieved in the CLRT work (around 99%) are
impressive but would result in an impractical number of false alarms (1%) if each mis-
classification was treated directly as an intrusion. Similarly the new BPF physical finger-
printing work, while 100% accurate for the tested pumps and relays, achieved only an 88%
true positive rate with a false positive rate of 5% for motors. Therefore, any practical appli-
cation of these fingerprinting techniques to detect intrusions would leverage the significant
body of work [49] [50] on IDS alert correlation to manage the number of alarms.
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4.6 Conclusions
In this chapter we presented two novel methods for passively fingerprinting devices on
ICS networks. After evaluating the methods using real world datasets and controlled lab
experiments, fingerprint classification accuracies ranged from 88% to perfect 100%. Both
techniques provide no security guarantees, but significantly increase the difficulty for an
adversary to successfully attack the system, providing important input into a real-world
ICS intrusion detection system.
Combining the RTT observations from Chapter 3 and the CLRT methods here suggests
that embedded devices like those in ICS networks are uniquely well suited for fingerprint-
ing techniques based on their processing and execution times. The next chapter extends





Programmable logic controllers (PLCs) interface the cyber world with the physical world,
continuously executing their control program scan cycles of reading physical inputs, ex-
ecuting control logic, and updating physical outputs such as motors, valves, and pumps
to control the power grid, manufacturing, and chemical processing facilities. Unfortu-
nately, as critical as these devices are, they are still being sold insecure by design. Not
only are vulnerabilities being found at increasing rates in related software [51], but vendors
still struggle to implement the most basic security functions like passwords and message
authentication. With strict downtime requirements discouraging frequent patching, limited
resources prohibiting strong cryptography, and vendors who are slow to respond to obvious
security issues, these vulnerabilities will be solved any time soon. To secure these networks
before an attack on an ICS results in the first cyber related loss of life, it is necessary to
build strong scalable techniques for detecting intrusions on vulnerable ICS networks.
To help address this problem, techniques were developed to detect changes to PLC
programming at the application layer. The application layer represents one of the easiest
vectors for attackers to stealthily cause physical damage to the victim facility, and in fact
is the only method used so far in real-world attacks, namely Stuxnet [42]. It was again
used in the theoretical ransomware attacks demonstrated on PLCs at the RSA Conference
this year [52] [53]. The unique aspects of PLCs including the low-powered hardware,
real-time operating systems, and deterministic cyclic execution of the control programs
combine to allow accurate fingerprinting of the current program running on the device. By
monitoring the execution times of the program running on the PLC, changes to the program
104
can be detected with high accuracy and low false positives. These execution times can be
monitored from the underlying diagnostic connection, or by adding just a few lines of
code to the PLC program to gather more accurate measurements. Both of these approaches
require no modifications to the underlying firmware, no action by the vendors of the devices,
and can be immediately implemented by ICS operators.
The significant contributions of this research include:
• The first comprehensive measurement of the effects of program changes on PLC scan
cycle times
• Improved methods for more accurate measurement of scan cycle times when diag-
nostic cycle time resolution is coarse
• Novel techniques for detecting PLC program modifications from both the network
and local access using cycle time signatures
• White box modeling approaches for estimating scan cycle time signatures from source
code, for rare execution branches
• Unique application of proof-of-work functions to provide intrusion detection mech-
anisms for low powered real-time devices
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Relevant background infor-
mation on the design and operation of PLCS is given in Section 5.2. The threat model
addressed and assumptions made in this research are explained in Section 5.3 and details
about the experimental setup are given in Section 5.4. Section 5.5 addresses a low skilled
attacker model and measures the effects different instructions have on scan cycle times
and how accurately scan cycle times can be used to detect added instructions. These basic
observations and techniques are then extended with white box analysis for rare branching
conditions. Change detection algorithms are applied in Section 5.6 to detect a medium skill
adversary adding the minimum amount of instructions necessary for a logic bomb trigger.
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Figure 5.1: Architecture of a PLC
Finally, Section 5.7 addresses a more intelligent attacker model by applying proof-of-work
functions as a means of more robustly detecting added instructions to the program. Over-
all performance in terms of accuracy and security against certain attacks are discussed in
Section 5.8 and final conclusions of this chapter are drawn in Section 5.9.
5.2 Background
To understand the techniques proposed in this chapter, first a general overview of PLC
operation and architecture is helpful. PLCs are essentially industrialized microcontrollers,
providing the bridge between the cyber and physical worlds by controlling devices such as
valves, pumps, and motors in response to operator input or their preprogrammed control
logic. They are used in a wide range of applications including the control of power gener-
ation, water treatment and distribution, various stages in the oil and gas vertical, and even
for smaller automation tasks such as elevators, escalators, and roller coasters. PLCs in gen-
eral follow the architecture illustrated in Figure 5.1, with resource limited processors at the
bottom layer. As an example, the highest end PLC model being sold today from Schneider
Modicon boasts a 266 MHz processor with 11 MB of RAM with costs ranging upwards of
twenty thousand dollars [54].
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Figure 5.2: PLC Scan Cycle Times
On top of the low powered hardware, the PLC typically runs some form of Linux based
real-time operating system, such as VxWorks, to provide deterministic guarantees of pro-
gram execution times. At the application layer of the PLC sits the runtime environment
which the user interfaces with to load the desired control logic program. The control logic
program is executed inside an endless loop, illustrated in Figure 5.2, with the PLC contin-
uously reading physical inputs, executing the control program, updating physical outputs,
and performing system functions such as network communication. The runtime environ-
ment monitors the execution of the control program and provides diagnostic information
such as CPU and memory usage as well as the PLC scan cycle time, typically defined as
the time it takes for one whole cycle of Figure 5.2. However, some vendors measure the
scan cycle time only by the control logic execution times.
5.3 Threat Model and Assumptions
The threat model this research addresses is that of an adversary of varying skill levels whose
goal is to maliciously reprogram a PLC at the user application layer. This threat model was
chosen, and not one where an adversary has compromised the underlying operating system,
because it mirrors the only known attack on PLCs to date and is in fact the most feasible
scenario for a successful attack.
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Historical. To date, the only publicly known real-world cyber attacks that achieved
a physical impact on ICS networks followed this threat model. Stuxnet, as complex of
an attack as it was and skilled as the adversaries behind it were, did not exploit any vul-
nerabilities on the Siemens PLCs themselves, but rather used a compromised engineering
workstation (a PC on the ICS network) to simply reprogram the PLCs with malicious con-
trol logic. Additionally, the Ukrainian power outages were not caused by zero-day exploits
on the circuit breaker equipment, but again simply used a compromised workstation to send
legitimate commands [55]. Finally, the recent demonstration of a ransomware attack at the
2017 RSA Conference only attacked the application layer of the PLCs, reprogramming
them with malicious control logic [52] [53].
Feasibility. Attackers, even with nation-state level skill, tend to take the path of least
resistance in achieving their goals. Unless the target PLCs are directly facing the Internet,
the path an adversary must take to pivot down to the PLC level most likely would use an
engineering workstation as a stepping stone. If the attacker has already compromised such
a system, it is much easier for him to use the legitimate machine and software to achieve
his goals stealthily than to launch an exploit. By choosing the attacker model used here,
we force the attacker to add yet another step in his attack chain. This not only increases
the time and resources he must spend, deterring cybercriminal actors, but also increases the
complexity of the attack and thus the chances the attacker will make a detectable mistake.
The attacker is assumed to be able to observe all traffic and scan cycle times being sent
over the network and to have full knowledge of the proposed detection methods. How-
ever, given the stated assumption that the attacker is only modifying the user application
layer, the diagnostic information coming from the underlying system can only be indirectly
modified by shaping the control program. Low skilled attackers are addressed first, in a
scenario where the PLCs are reprogrammed with completely different functionality. Then
medium skilled attackers are addressed simulating scenarios where the attacker attempts to
insert the smallest logic bomb possible in the program, but is not knowledgeable enough to
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spoof the reported scan cycle times. Finally, high skilled attackers are addressed with the
inclusion of proof-of-work functions to make it infeasible for attackers to mimic the scan
cycle signature without removing instructions from the original program.
5.4 Experimental Setup
The devices used in this research come from three of the most popular PLC vendors:
Siemens, Allen Bradley, and Schneider Modicon, who combined hold the majority mar-
ket share in PLCs. Relevant information about each model is summarized in Table 5.1,
including the memory available for user programs and the resolution that diagnostic con-
nections give for scan cycle times. The application memory limits an adversary’s ability to
precompute and store proof-of-work results and the cycle time resolution limits how small
of a change the adversary can make undetected. Measurement techniques of the scan cycle
times are demonstrated first using this system level diagnostic information, and then later
more accurate and robust methods for measuring scan cycle times are proposed in Section
5.5.3.
Table 5.1: Overview of Devices and System Information
PLC Model Application Memory Cycle Resolution
MicroLogix 1100 8 KB 100 µs
Siemens S7-1200 75 KB 1 ms
Schneider M221 256 KB 1 µs
Schneider M241 8 MB 1 µs
It is difficult to obtain a significant body of large scale example PLC programs due
to the non standard program formats and the fact that the system integrators writing the
programs often consider them proprietary intellectual property. However, a small body
of real world programs were gathered from the ”Mr. PLC” forum website [56] where
users have posted example code from real projects to help others learn. The top four most
viewed PLC programs for Allen Bradley PLCs (excluding outliers that were extremely
simple or extremely complex) were manually ported to all the PLCs in Table 5.1. The
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general description of the programs are summarized in Table 5.2, with their complexity,
according to the MicroLogix 1100.
To measure the effects of small program changes on scan cycle times, programs were
written for all PLCs that tested increasing numbers of the most common instructions such
as timer blocks, counter blocks, examine if closed (XIC), and move operations. Addition-
ally, the example programs from Table 5.2 were modified by adding the smallest amount
of instructions possible for an attacker to implement a logic bomb in different ways. These
included the addition of a timer, a counter, a single compare operation, and a single XIC in-
struction. For all experiments, unless otherwise noted, a total of 10,000 scan cycle samples
were taken at a rate of 10 samples per second totaling over a 16 minute duration.
Table 5.2: Complexity of Programs Tested
Program Description Instructions Data Words
P1 Motor Starter 553 1068
P2 Sequencer Example 365 160
P3 Bottling Plant 419 433
P4 Conveyor Belt 615 425
5.5 Change Measurement
At the most basic level, the foundation of this research is based on the idea that any change
to the control logic program will produce some change in the program execution time.
This section explores the intuitive theory behind why this is especially true for PLCs and
provides detailed measurements of how the execution times are effected by different in-
structions.
5.5.1 Theory
There are important differences, both in their design and usage, between PLCs and per-
sonal computers (PCs) that make the use of execution times a powerful basis for intrusion
detection for one and not the other.
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Modern PCs are built on Gigahertz processors where single instructions take mere
nanoseconds to execute, which is infeasible to accurately measure. PLCs are built on much
slower microcontroller processors typically on the order of tens of MHz. Assuming a fully
pipelined processor running at 10MHz a single instruction on the CPU takes a measurable
length of time at 0.1µs. The operating systems typical today on PCs treat all user processes
roughly the same when scheduling them, with run times varying widely depending on the
number of times a program was interrupted by other processes. PLCs on the other hand
are designed with real-time operating systems that guarantee deterministic scheduling of
high priority processes. The number and computational burden of the programs running on
PCs also varies widely further contributing to unpredictability in program execution times.
Again, the case is different for PLCs where a constant number of processes are running and
there is little to no human interaction to introduce sporadic CPU loads.
5.5.2 Baseline Measurements
As a first pass, we address the least skilled attacker model where the attacker reprograms
the PLC with completely different functionality without trying to match any signatures.
For a simple illustration of the differences in scan cycle times this would cause, consider
the PLCs and example programs described in Section 5.4. All programs were similar in
complexity, with hundreds of instructions, and all PLCs were in the same price range being
lower end models less than $1000 each. For this first set of experiments, program execution
times were gathered for all devices using their own standard diagnostic connection, with
different vendors offering different resolution, as listed in Table 5.1.
For the Modicon M221, the system resolution of the scan cycle time was given in
microseconds. In Figure 5.3, all programs exhibited similar ranges of standard deviations
in scan cycle times, but had consistent differences in mean execution times. Even the two
closest programs, the conveyor belt and sequencer example, consistently had more than a
2 µs difference.
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Figure 5.3: Modicon M221 Program Execution Times, resolution in µs
The Modicon M241, a more expensive model, also provides microsecond level preci-
sion for scan cycle measurements and exhibits even more clear differences in Figure 5.4.
For the Allen Bradley MicroLogix 1100, the diagnostic information only provides scan
cycle time resolutions of 100µs, resulting in much more overlap in Figure 5.5.
Finally, for the Siemens S7-1200, the system level diagnostic information only provides
scan cycle measurements at a 1ms resolution. Given that all programs tested were rela-
tively small, no program execution time exceeded a mean time of 1ms so such diagnostic
information is useless for detailed classification. However, the underlying theory that any
change to the control program will affect the program execution time still holds, and this
observation simply motivates the development of a more accurate method for measuring
scan cycle times.
5.5.3 Improved Scan Cycle Measurement Methods
Given the low resolution of the MicroLogix 1100 and S7-1200 diagnostic level measure-
ments of scan cycle times, example programs exhibited little to no clear classifiable differ-
ences. However, if modifications are made to the PLC’s control program, more accurate
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Figure 5.4: Modicon M241 Program Execution Times, resolution in µs
Figure 5.5: MicroLogix 1100 Program Execution Times, resolution in 100µs
113
Figure 5.6: Method for more accurate measure of scan cycle times
measurements can be taken.
Given the understanding that PLC control programs are essentially executed in an end-
less loop as fast as possible, by measuring the number of loops executed over a known
period of time we can estimate the average execution time over that period. To implement
this, the PLC program needs to be modified slightly to increment a counter for every scan
cycle executed and report that count over whatever ICS protocol is already being used, such
as Modbus. The monitoring device then simply measures the time elapsed and the count
progression to calculate average scan cycle times, as in Figure 5.6.
When this method is again applied to the example programs on the MicroLogix 1100,
in Figure 5.7, the programs are now easily separable. Note that similarly for the M221,
even though the bottling and sequencer example appear very close, there is consistently
more than a 3 µs difference in their execution times.
Even though the 1 ms resolution provided no information for classifying programs on
the S7-1200, the improved measurement techniques now show clear differences in Figure
5.8.
For the sake of thoroughness, these improved measurement methods were also tested on
the M221 and M241 PLCs. However, the surprising discovery was made that these PLCs
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Figure 5.7: Improved Method: MicroLogix 1100 Scan Cycle Times
Figure 5.8: Improved Method: S7-1200 Scan Cycle Times
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implement scan cycle execution differently than the other two vendors, and differently from
a literal interpretation of their documentation. Both the M221 and M241 documentation
claim that the ”freewheeling” mode of operation executes the scan cycles as fast as possible,
similar to both the Allen Bradley and Siemens PLCs. When the count progression method
was used to estimate the average execution times, the Modicon PLCs were instead found
to execute at the fastest possible millisecond interval or even two-millisecond intervals.
In other words, the system diagnostic information for the M221 would report scan cycle
times in the hundreds of microseconds, but was found to actually be executing the control
program every two milliseconds exactly. Similarly, when the M241 was reporting scan
cycle times in the hundreds of microseconds, it was actually found to be executing the
control program exactly every one millisecond. Presumably, the reasoning behind this
discrepancy is to ensure the underlying system has enough CPU time to perform other
critical functions. This limits the accuracy of the basic count progression method of scan
cycle measurement, but modifications are proposed in Section 5.7 to work around this
limitation.
For the remainder of this chapter, all measurements unless otherwise stated, were taken
from the system diagnostics for the M221 and M241, and the improved count progression
method for the MicroLogix 1100 and Siemens S7-1200.
5.5.4 Instructions
The previous section described obvious differences between different real-world PLC pro-
grams, but in order for the techniques to be useful, they must be able to detect minor
changes in the program. As a first step in this direction, experiments were conducted to add
increasing numbers of common instructions to empty programs in order to simply measure
how much a single instruction impacts the cycle times. The most common instructions
by far in PLC programming are the use of timer on delay blocks (TON), count up blocks
(CTU), moving data into different variables (MOV), examine if closed (XIC) instructions,
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Figure 5.9: Effects of timer blocks on execution times
and output energize (OTE). Figures 5.9 through 5.11 illustrate the average execution times
of programs with standard deviations represented with error bars.
For each PLC, every instruction takes a different amount of time, with MOV, XIC,
and OTE instructions taking the least amount of time and timer and counter blocks taking
more. Figures 5.9 through 5.11 illustrate average execution times for some of the instruc-
tions. For the sake of space, the remaining instructions may be found in Appendix 5.5.4.
Execution times were calculated by taking the slope of the line representing the increase in
total program execution time over the increase in number of instructions. These results are
summarized in Table 5.3, and become useful for the white box modeling techniques pro-
posed in Section 5.5.5. It is important to note that the XIC instructions represent IF checks
on single bits, and that execution time of Boolean algebra operations on them (AND and
OR) must also be calculated.
Instruction Execution Times
Figures 5.12 through 5.14 illustrate other common instruction execution times.
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Figure 5.10: Effects of XIC instructions on execution times
Figure 5.11: Effects of Boolean operations on execution times
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Figure 5.12: Effects of Output Energize (OTE) instruction on execution times
Figure 5.13: Effects of counter (CTU) instruction on execution times
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Table 5.3: Average Instruction Execution Times [µs]
PLC ML-1100 S7-1200 M221 M241
XIC 0.86 0.312 0.233 0.08
(AND/OR) 4.11 0.64 0.32 0.02
OTE 2.45 0.237 0.509 0.04
MOV 5.84 2.04 2.85 0.358
TON 6.33 8.89 5.32 1.81
CTU 7.06 9.89 7.91 1.24
Figure 5.14: Effects of move operations on execution times
5.5.5 Program Branching
Most control program execution times are largely static in nature, essentially evaluating the
same Boolean algebra expressions over and over again and not executing jump statements
to significantly different execution paths. Slight variations occur depending on how quickly
the Boolean expression is evaluated (e.g., anything ANDed with a 0 is 0), but over the
hundreds of thousands of cycles that occur in a few seconds, these typically average out.
All of the example programs found in this research exhibited static execution times and
only used jump instructions to consistently and always execute the same subroutines.
However, there may exist cases where more complex control programs use jump state-
ments to change the mode of operation, for example to a maintenance mode or when a fault
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Figure 5.15: Execution times of fault modes on the M221
is detected, that significantly alters the execution times. To illustrate this, the four example
programs used in this research were modified to have a branch path that simulated a fault
scenario, where the original program is jumped over and outputs are simply set to a known
”safe state”. Note that with this modification, all example programs are now essentially
executing the same instructions resulting in very close overlap, for example in Figures 5.15
and 5.16.
Different modes of execution, such as these fault modes, should ideally occur on a
rare basis. However, given the approach described so far, any change detection algorithm
will immediately begin alerting operators of a change in the program if the mode changes.
Granted, this could be perfectly acceptable as the operators may in fact want to be alerted
when the process has moved into an abnormal state. However, if it is a regularly occurring
change in mode, as for maintenance, the change detection system would also have to train
on what the maintenance mode executions look like, or know what the rare mode will look
like before it observes it, which motivates the need for white box modeling approaches.
The previous techniques proposed in this chapter have all been based on real samples
from real devices, making them black box techniques. However, in the unlikely scenario
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Figure 5.16: Execution times of fault modes on the ML-1100
Figure 5.17: Execution times of fault modes on the S7-1200
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that a control program has rare branching conditions that significantly alter the program
execution times, those conditions may be so rare that it does not encounter them in the
training period.
Fortunately, given access to the source code of the program and knowledge of the ex-
ecution times of each instruction, the expected execution times of those rare branches can
be constructed beforehand and the algorithm trained on those samples. This task is made
even easier given that some vendors include in their documentation the average execution
time of each instruction, as in the case of the MicroLogix 1100 [57]. If such information is
not readily available, experiments as in Section 5.5.4 can be carried out to build a database
of how long each instruction takes to execute.
To illustrate this, ”fault” condition branching was implemented in the PLCs that con-
sisted of simply a jump statement and setting ten outputs to a ”safe” state. This equivalently
is 10 OTE instructions and the jump statement. When the white box methods using the ven-
dor supplied executions for the MicroLogix 1100 are applied to this condition, the ten OTE
instructions are estimated to take 14.3 µs to 15 µs on top of the original average execution
time of 590 µs for an empty program. This results in an estimated scan cycle range of
604.3 to 605 µs, about ten microseconds short of the actual observed execution times.
Using the more accurate measurements for the OTE obtained from Table 5.3, the white
box methods estimate a mean execution time of 614 µs nearly identical to the times ob-
served in Figure 5.16. The concept of white box modeling more complex execution paths
is explored in more detail in Appendix 5.5.6, but the amount of uncertainty in knowing
which instructions are executed resulted in lower accuracy.
5.5.6 White Box Modeling
To demonstrate how white box modeling might work for more complex program branches,
consider the Motor Starter program for the MicroLogix 1100. Table 5.4 lists the total
number of instructions in the program and their corresponding average execution times
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from the vendor documentation. Note that XIO is simply the negated form of XIC, JSR is
the ”jump to subroutine” instruction, and END is simply returning from each subroutine.
When the totals are added up, the estimated range of control program execution time was
between 141.88 and 159.52 µs. Given the average execution time of an empty program
was approximately 590 µs, the white box model estimate of the average scan cycle time
for the motor starter program comes to a range of 731.88 to 749.52 µs. Note that this is
close, but a slight underestimate of the observed execution time around 760 µs.
Table 5.4: White Box Model for Motor Starter on ML-1100
Instruction Quantity Min Time [µs] Max Time [µs]
XIC 54 1.45 1.5
XIO 12 1.5 1.5
OTE 16 1.43 1.5
TON 8 2.59 4.06
JSR 2 0.84 1.87
END 3 0.1 0.1
Total 141.88 159.52
This underestimate can be attributed to the inaccurate execution times from the manual
discovered earlier in Section 5.5.4. Instead of thinking of XIO and XIC instructions as
single instructions themselves, one must also consider whether they are being executed in
series or parallel (i.e. being ANDed or ORed). If several XIC instructions are in series
and the first one is evaluated as True, then there is no need to evaluate the rest. Likewise
if XIC instructions are in parallel and the first is evaluated as False, the remaining XIC
instructions do not need to be executed. Therefore, we must estimate how many of the
additional XIC instructions result in AND or OR operations that immediately return an
answer for the entire statement. One option would be to make the naive assumption that
for every additional XIC instruction, there is a 50% chance that it will immediately return
an answer. However, since the primary purpose of the change detection algorithm is to
detect positive change (i.e. added instructions), the white box model should err on the
side of overestimating the mean to avoid a large number of false positives. Choosing a
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Figure 5.18: White Box Model ROC for ML-1100
conservative estimate that 66% of the Boolean operations are executed results in Equation
5.1, where tXIC represents the execution time of all XIC instructions in that rung, n is the
number of execution times, and Bt is the execution time for Boolean operations. Using this
equation and the more accurate measurements of execution times from Table 5.3, again we
recreate the Motor Starter program for the MicroLogix 1100.
tXIC =

XICt n = 1
XICt + 0.66
n−1 ∗ (Bt) ∗ (n− 1) n > 1
(5.1)
Building a white box model using this equation and the values in Table 5.3 for all
other calculations, gives a white box estimated mean of 763.5 µs, close to the observed
mean time of 760 µs but as expected, slightly over. When this estimated time is fed into
the change detection algorithm, the classification results are slightly lower, illustrated in




The end goal of the proposed change detection techniques is to make it infeasibly difficult
for an adversary to modify the original control program to achieve stealthy goals. In order
to remain stealthy, he must not only evade any network intrusion detection tools already
in place, but he must also refrain from causing any significant immediate changes to the
physical process, or the operators will immediately know something is wrong. The easiest
way to do this would be to add a logic bomb on top of the original program that only
sabotages the process on rare occasions, or until some signal is given to coordinate an
attack across multiple PLCs. Therefore at the absolute minimum, an attacker must add
some form of trigger or logic check to the original code to implement his logic bomb.
In the case of PLC programming, these triggers could take the form of a timer, counter,
comparison statement, or a simple examine if closed (XIC) instruction. If the proposed
scan cycle based change detection techniques can detect a single addition of any of these
instruction, they can therefore detect the addition of any form of logic bomb.
While there are many options for change detection algorithms to apply to this scenario,
the basic cumulative sum (CUSUM) method from 1954 [58] was chosen to illustrate per-
formance. More sophisticated algorithms exist and could potentially perform even better
than the impressive results achieved here. The CUSUM method intuitively operates on the
idea of cumulatively adding the difference between a variable and its known mean over
time. If that cumulative sum ever passes a certain threshold, then the decision is made that
a change has occurred. More formally, it is defined according to Equation 5.2, where Sn
represents the cumulative sum value at sample n, xn represents the value being monitored
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at sample number n, and wn is some weight, usually the mean value of x.
S0 = 0
Sn+1 = max(0, Sn + xn − wn)
(5.2)
CUSUM in the form of Equation 5.2 is designed to detect positive change in a variable,
and so only this form of CUSUM was used in this research, since any addition of code to
add a logic bomb will likely cause a positive increase in scan cycle times. Negative changes
can also be detected using the min function instead of max in the equation and alerting
when Sn crosses below the negative threshold. Application of this form of CUSUM could
be used to detect malicious removal of instructions and shortening of the scan cycle time,
illustrated briefly in Appendix 5.6.3. The negative change detection form of CUSUM is
also demonstrated in Section 5.7 with the application of proof-of-work functions.
5.6.2 Results
To test the performance of the CUSUM change detection algorithm applied to scan cycle
times, training data was taken from half of the original samples for each of the example
programs. The mean execution times were measured over this training set and used as the
wn variable in Equation 5.2. The testing data consisted of the remaining half of the original
example programs as well as 10,000 samples each for four different modifications of the
original program. These modifications included all possible methods for the minimum
requirements for an attacker to insert a logic bomb into the code: adding a single timer,
a counter, a comparison statement, or an examine if closed (XIC) instruction. The false
positive rate was defined as the ratio of the number of times a sample was incorrectly
classified as a change over the total number of samples from the unmodified test set. The
true positive rate was defined as the ratio of the number of samples correctly classified as
changes over the total number of samples from the modified test sets.
With these definitions, receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curves were plotted for
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each PLC, comparing the trade-off between false positive rates and true positive rates.
Figure 5.19a illustrates classification performance for the MicroLogix 1100. Due to the
processor being so slow and each additional instruction adding so much time, detection
rates were extremely high with over 99% true positive rates at zero false positives. The
CUSUM change detection algorithm is sequential, in that it operates on every sample that
arrives, which means that true positive rates are not the only metric that should be calcu-
lated. Instead, the average time to detection is used to measure how quickly the algorithm
can detect the change. For these experiments, average detection times for the given false
positive rates were calculated by choosing a random place to start in the test data of mod-
ified programs and measuring the number of samples the algorithm took to first alert on
the change. With false positive rates of less than 0.5%, the average detection time for the
MicroLogix 1100 was in the tens of samples, which with the sampling rate of 10Hz used
here corresponds to alerting in a few seconds.
The other PLCs are built with faster processors, so the minuscule change of adding
a single XIC instruction proved harder to detect. However, the corresponding average
detection times at a zero false positive rate were all within minutes of the program changing.
Although positive change detection was the primary threat model addressed here in
order to detect the addition of logic bombs, negative change detection was also considered
for the case where an attacker is removing instructions from the program. This is explored
in more detail in Appendix 5.6.3 and was found to achieve similar detection accuracies.
5.6.3 Negative Change Detection
Negative change detection using the CUSUM algorithm is achieved by simply using the
”min” function instead of the ”max” function, and alerting when the value of S falls below
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(a) ROC Curve for MicroLogix 1100
(b) Detection Times for MicroLogix 1100
Figure 5.19: MicroLogix 1100 Performance
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(a) ROC Curve for S7-1200
(b) Detection Times for S7-1200
Figure 5.20: S7-1200 Performance
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(a) ROC Curve for M221
(b) Detection Times for M221
Figure 5.21: M221 Performance
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(a) ROC Curve for M241
(b) Detection Times for M241
Figure 5.22: M241 Performance
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Figure 5.23: Negative Change Detection for M221
the negative threshold, as described in Equation 5.3.
S0 = 0
Sn+1 = min(0, Sn + xn − wn)
(5.3)
To test negative change detection, the baseline was first trained on half of the modified
program data (the versions with added instructions) as ”normal” and then tested on the orig-
inal versions. Since this is virtually testing the same changes, performance is essentially
the same, as illustrated in Figure 5.23.
5.7 Robust Change Detection
The previous techniques are able to detect low and medium skilled attackers, but they fail
to address the scenario where an attacker is modifying the scan cycle counts being used




Traditionally, proof-of-work (POW) functions have been used in scenarios to prove a node
has committed a minimum number of clock cycles before dedicating any system resources
to handling their connection, in order to mitigate denial of service attacks. They achieve
this by using a special class of functions that are computationally expensive to solve, but
orders of magnitude easier to verify.
For example, consider the discrete logarithm problem which is the foundation of most
public key cryptography algorithms used today [59]. The underlying theory is that given
proper choices of a large prime p and a g that is a primitive root modulo p, there is no
efficient method to solve for the integer k in the equation gkmod p = bwhere b is a member
of the multiplicative group of integers modulo p or b ∈ Z∗p . The most efficient algorithm
proposed to date to solve this problem has running time that is exponential in half the
number of digits in the size of the group. However, verification of answers to the discrete
log problem can efficiently be achieved using exponentiation by squaring, which requires
blog2 nc multiplications and at most blog2 nc multiplications, where n is the exponent.
By taking advantage of the severe resource limitations on PLCs (kilobytes of RAM and
Megahertz processors) and their deterministic real-time operating systems, POW functions
can be used to provide an upper bound guarantee that the PLC is not executing additional
instructions in the background. This is accomplished with the combination of two applica-
tions of POW functions:
• Measuring scan cycle count progress
• Proof of minimum scan cycle time
The first application of POW functions for PLCs mirrors the scan cycle count method
explained in Section 5.5.3. Recall that the method is based on the fact that even the smallest
consistent addition of instructions in the control program will affect the scan cycle slope and
eventually be detected if monitored for long enough. Unfortunately, that simple approach
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suffers from the weakness that an intelligent attacker can easily modify the addition of
scan cycle counts to match the original slope since an ”addition” instruction takes the same
amount of CPU cycles whether it is adding a one, or one hundred. An attacker however
cannot skip steps in solving the POW function and simply add one-hundred to the counts,
instead he must actually execute the one-hundred steps in the POW function while still
keeping the execution time of the program consistent with the original slope. This is only
possible if he first removes instructions from the original program, thus increasing the
chances that he will cause some form of immediate change in the physical process that the
operators will notice.
The second application of POW functions covers the scenarios discovered in Section
5.5.3, where the control program is not executed as fast as possible, and actually is only
executed at fixed intervals. The main idea behind this second layer of POW functions is
essentially to fill up the idle time of a scan cycle with steps of the POW function up to a
desired maximum scan cycle time. Again, an attacker cannot skip any steps in the function,
but must actually execute them in order to return the correct answers to the verifier. The
verifier can then regularly poll the PLC for the supposed number of scan cycles executed
and the current progress on both POW functions. If the scan cycle time estimates that
the verifier calculates from those polls do not match the known signature, or if the POW
verification fails, he knows that the PLC has been modified.
To demonstrate how POW functions may be applied for intrusion detection in resource-
starved real-time systems, the previous discrete logarithm problem was chosen. However,
one difficulty in applying POW functions to PLCs is that the severe resource limitations
must be taken into account when designing the POW function. Care must be taken that the
computational load of solving the POW problem does not significantly effect the execution
of the control program. Furthermore, some of the PLCs can only perform the mathematical
operations, such as the modulus operator, on 16-bit numbers, so the parameters of the
discrete log problem must be chosen carefully. This latter condition must also be balanced
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with the security requirement that the size of the group of integers modulo p must be large
enough that it is infeasible for an attacker to reliably guess the pseudo-random results
obtained in the steps of solving the POW function.
For the purposes of this research, it was decided that a minimum group size of 1000
would provide a strong enough guarantee that the results would not be consistently guessed
correctly. This effectively means that at least 10 bits would be required to store the value of
p. To find the upper limit on the size of q, we consider the requirement for it to be infeasible
for an attacker to pre-compute the results and store them on the PLC without removing the
original program. Given that the application memory available on three of the four PLCs
used in this research was less than 1MB, it was decided to design the POW function as to
require at least 1MB of memory to store all possible precomputed results. Using an upper
limit of 12 bits to store q provides a range of choices for q including 396 primes, each
providing a group size on average of 2509. Assuming 2 bytes are required to store each
step in the POW function comes to a total storage requirement of M = 396 ∗ 2509 ∗ 2 =
1.99MB, assuming the verifier properly cycles through all POW variables. Note that more
powerful PLCs with more memory are also likely to have larger processors capable of
operating on 32-bit numbers, allowing this parameter to be appropriately modified. Finally,
with the assumption that a maximum of 12 bits are used to store q, a maximum limit of 4
bits is left for g.
To illustrate the steps in the POW function, consider the discrete log problem where
q = 3779 and we are using the primitive root g = 6 for the generator. For each scan cycle,
the PLC multiplies the current POW value by 6, divides by 3779, stores the remainder as
the current progress, and keeps track of how many scan cycles have been executed, which
is equivalently k from the the discrete log equation. Now at any point in time, the verifier
can ask how many scan cycles have been executed (k) and what is the corresponding POW
value, and using exponentiation by squaring quickly confirm that the two match.
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5.7.2 Results
For the MicroLogix 1100, the scan cycles are executed as fast as possible, so only the first
method of POW functions was necessary. As a reminder, this involves the PLC taking one
step towards solving a POW for every scan cycle. When this method was applied, again
the detection accuracy was high, with Figures 5.24a and 5.24b showing a true positive rate
of 98.5% and an average detection time of 25 samples (2.5 seconds) at zero false positives
for the test set.
Where previously with the Schneider Modicon PLCs the true execution times were
only on millisecond boundaries, we can now use the POW functions to verify that a certain
amount of work was completed each scan cycle, which means that we can verify that no
additional instructions were being executed in the background. Plotting the mean number
of POW steps completed per scan cycle time reveals how much idle time there was be-
tween the true execution time and the millisecond boundary, resulting in the distributions
in Figures 5.25 and 5.26 being mirrored versions of the execution times observed in Figure
5.3 and 5.4.
When the negative change detection form of CUSUM is applied to the number of POW
steps taken per scan cycle, we can effectively
5.8 Discussion
5.8.1 Performance
Detection performance both in terms of ROC curves and average detection times, were
found to be acceptable for all PLCs and example programs. Timers, counters, and compare
statements were all detected with high accuracies above 90% true positive rates at less than
1% false positives. XIC instructions proved more difficult, but still were detectable at rates
above 75%. This means that an attacker attempting to add any form of logic bomb must
remove instructions from the original program while not causing immediate disruption to
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(a) ML-1100 Proof of Work ROC
(b) ML-1100 Proof of Work Detection Time
Figure 5.24: ML-1100 POW Performance
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Figure 5.25: Mirrored Distribution of M221 Using POW Steps
Figure 5.26: Mirrored Distribution of M241 Using POW Steps
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(a) M221 Proof of Work ROC
(b) M221 Proof of Work Detection Time
Figure 5.27: M221 POW Performance
140
the physical process in order to remain stealthy. Average detection times at false positive
rates less than 1% ranged from seconds to no more than minutes.
Possibly the most significant aspect of this accurate performance is the fact that this
method performs just the same regardless of whether the PLC was reprogrammed from the
network (which could be detected using other means), but also from potential insiders with
direct physical access to local programming port.
5.8.2 Attacks
The threat model addressed in this research assumes that an attacker is attempting to mali-
ciously modify an existing PLC program at the application layer while remaining stealthy.
As a reminder, this mirrors the only real-world attack on PLCs to date and is most feasibly
achieved if the attacker inserts a logic bomb into an existing control program. We now con-
sider how the proposed change detection techniques perform against a variety of attacks
previously designed against software attestation techniques.
Code Optimization
One of the first papers describing attacks against the SWATT software attestation protocol
suggested that the security of the techniques rely on two important assumptions: 1) That
the SWATT algorithm is using the most efficient implementation of the checksum and 2)
That they were correctly assuming the most efficient method of attack [60]. The authors
then implement a more efficient attack than the SWATT algorithm assumed, but still admit
that the SWATT verifier could detect their attack.
While the second assumption directly applies to the methods proposed here, the first
assumption requires some rephrasing to fit this setup. In the context of the application layer
PLC program, the security of the proposed research depends on the assumption that a) the
original program is already the most efficient implementation, and b) the POW function
used is the most efficient implementation. If an attacker is able to optimize either the
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original program or the POW function used, he may be able to save enough time to insert
some malicious instructions.
Regarding assumption 1.a), an attacker attempting to optimize a PLC program is going
to encounter many obstacles. First recall that the attacker model here is one where the ad-
versary is not modifying the firmware, but simply loading a new application layer program,
written in ladder logic for example. The attacker can only modify this ladder logic program
and does not have the ability to directly control what CPU level instructions the program
gets compiled to, making it significantly harder to automatically find optimizations. Sec-
ond, PLC programs are so singular in purpose they are already very simple, leaving little
room for optimization. The example programs here only consisted of around 500 total in-
structions each, with a fraction of those being executed every scan cycle. The chances of
an adversary being able to find an application layer optimization in this small amount of
code and replace it with malicious instructions that achieve his goal while also taking the
same amount of time to execute is very small.
Many of the same arguments can be made for assumption 1.b), that the implementation
of the POW function is already the most efficient. Again, the attacker can only modify
application layer instructions performing the POW, not the underlying CPU instructions.
In the research proposed here using the discrete logarithm problem, each step in the POW
consisted simply of one multiplication instruction and one division instruction, leaving no
room for optimization. More efficient methods exist for calculating discrete logarithms, but
most require large memory space for precomputing results. Furthermore, the goal of these
more efficient methods is to solve a single POW problem, without showing all of the steps
taken to get the solution. In the methods proposed here, progress on the POW problem
is constantly being monitored, meaning any theoretical attack on the POW function must
be more efficient per step (i.e., the multiplication and division instructions), or must be so
much more efficient that it is capable of solving POW functions at the rate progress is being
polled for.
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Finally, assumption 2) assumes that the methods proposed here address the most effi-
cient method of attack. In this case we considered the addition of a single XIC instruction
in the main program loop and were able to reliably detect it. There is no way an adversary
can be more efficient than a single XIC instruction unless he inserts the instruction into an
already rarely executed branch of the program. While the techniques proposed here would
likely not be able to detect additions in a rare branch, this severely limits the kind of goals
an attacker could achieve.
Proxy Attack
Now consider the case of a ”proxy attack” defined in previous work on remote attesta-
tion[28]. In this attack, the device under test communicates with a faster proxy to calculate
the correct answer to the verification challenge instead of calculating the answer itself.
Unfortunately there are no hard theoretical guarantees that this isn’t possible against the
methods proposed here. However, there are a number practical reasons why it is infeasible.
Most importantly, the proposed use-case for the techniques would be part of an intrusion
detection system monitoring the ICS network. Therefore, if the PLC reaches out to a proxy
on the network for assistance, the attacker must also evade traditional ICS IDS techniques
already in place that look at the static topology and relatively static bandwidth usage. PLCs
typically only communicate with one or two other devices on the network and the commu-
nication consists almost entirely of polling for data, with much more infrequent ”write”
commands to the PLCs. In order for a proxy to accurately recreate the PLC’s scan cycle
progression, it must update and write new values to the PLC at least as fast as the rate at
which the PLC is being polled for POW progress. In a typical network where ”write” fre-
quencies are on the order of minutes or hours, a sudden and consistent increase to several




In order for any intrusion detection technique to be feasible, it must not significantly in-
terfere with the existing devices or network. The proposed approaches would add a small
amount of additional network traffic and in the case of the count progression measurement
and the POW functions, a small amount of code to execute on the PLC.
Regarding network traffic, PLCs are already typically polled for multiple process mea-
surements several times per second. To the process control engineers on the plant floor, the
scan cycle times being polled for would just be another measurement among the dozens
they are already taking from the PLC. Furthermore, the system diagnostic connections de-
signed by the vendors of the PLCs themselves poll the PLCs up to ten times per second for
information including scan cycle times, device name and model, and the current values of
all variables in the control program without any detrimental effects to the PLC or process
control network.
For the POW functions being added to the PLCs, the POW problem can be designed
to guarantee some maximum amount of time is never exceeded on the POW function and
thus some maximum amount of overhead is added. In the examples illustrated in this
chapter, the POW function was designed to simply extend the scan cycle to the next highest
millisecond boundary, guaranteeing that never more than a millisecond was added. Given
that scan cycle watchdog timer options are usually in the hundreds of milliseconds, and
that programs and devices are typically over-provisioned for safety, this is an acceptable
amount of overhead.
5.9 Conclusions and Future Work
PLCs are the vital link between the cyber and physical worlds, but unfortunately they are
still being sold insecure by design. This is unlikely to change anytime soon so in order
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to protect ICS networks from potential life-threatening cyber attacks, scalable and imme-
diately deployable techniques are required to protect the PLCs. To address this, change
detection algorithms were applied to monitor the control program execution time of the
real-time deterministic PLCs and alert on changes. At false positive rates less than 1%,
average true positive rates of greater than 90% were achieved with detection times on the
order of seconds or minutes. The basic techniques were extended to include more accurate
measurements of the scan cycle times and white box modeling to predict execution times of
rarely executed program branches. Finally proof-of-work functions were leveraged against
the resource-starved PLCs to provide more robust guarantees that no additional code is
being executed by the PLC. High accuracy performance and the difficult, but not impossi-
ble, attacks suggest the methods could add significant value as input into an ICS network
anomaly detection system. Future work in this direction will investigate stronger adver-
sary models attacking the underlying firmware, and will explore more accurate methods




Despite the alarm constantly being raised about the insecurity of ICS networks for over 10
years now, a significant amount of work remains to be done primarily due to three main
reasons. First, until know, little published data existed to educate researchers on what real-
world ICS networks even look like. Without such knowledge accurate simulations and
intrusion detection algorithms are very difficult to design. Second, attacks against ICS
networks are different from IT networks both in their methods and goals. An entirely new
class of attack based on false data injection is of primary concern for ICS networks, and the
goals typically focus on causing physical damage rather than stealing information. Finally,
standard IT approaches to network security do not translate well into the ICS environment.
The sensitive nature of ICS devices limits patch frequency and makes any kind of active
defense extremely undesirable, requiring strong passive techniques to provide security.
To address these many problems, fingerprinting techniques operating over ICS net-
works were proposed to identify various aspects of the system including software, hard-
ware, and physical devices for use in intrusion detection systems. First, a detailed traffic
characterization was performed on several power substation networks to examine whether
common stated assumptions about ICS networks were true, and to guide the development
of the fingerprinting techniques. One of the most interesting observations was that TCP
round trip times for the resource-starved embedded devices were heavily clustered based
on device type no matter how large the physical distance between them, suggesting they
were largely based on processing time. This insight led to the development of cross-layer
response time fingerprinting to passively identify device types based on the processing time
between TCP level acknowledgments and application layer responses. Device type classi-
fication accuracy using standard machine learning techniques reached as high as 99% on
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real-world substation traffic. To complement these techniques by addressing a different
aspect of ICS networks, methods were developed to fingerprint the physical devices of the
ICS. Previous work on physical fingerprinting was extended to improve relay classification
from 92% to 100% and extend the scope of the methods to valves, motors, and pumps. Per-
fect classification accuracy was attained for pumps and valves, with motor classification
reaching 88% true positive rate. Building on the idea behind the cross-layer response time
methods, techniques were then explored that expand the scope to general programmable
logic controllers by generating program fingerprints from the execution times of control
programs. True positive rates for detecting program changes were around 90% with false
positive rates under 1% and detection times on the order of minutes. The security of this
technique was enhanced by the addition of proof-of-work functions to provide a provable
upper bound guarantee that no additional instructions are being executed in the program.
When combined, all of the proposed fingerprinting techniques provide the passive security,
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